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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the ongoing goals of Al is to produce intelligent computational agents that can
collaborate with a human colleague to work together towards a common goal. In video
games in particular, game designs often call for AI programmers to build AI assistants,
or sidekicks, that must work alongside human players to achieve the game's objectives.
When a human could be pursuing any one of a number of possible objectives in a game,
the challenge for an Al sidekick involves understanding what their human colleagues
are trying to achieve, planning how the agent ought to help given that understanding,
and realizing when they need more information about the world or the human's
intentions and determining how to get it. These are challenging problems which
game designers are often forced to avoid or mitigate through specific design choices.
This thesis develops planning mechanisms for Al assistants that infer and influence
the intentions of their human colleagues through observation and communication,
adjusting their behavior to help the human based upon their understanding of human
intentions.
In video games an AI sidekick may dynamically take over from a player that has
lost network connectivity in a cooperative game and carry on in their place, as in
World in Conflict [20]. Alternatively, interacting with Al sidekicks may be central to
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a single-player video game experience, such as in the case of Yorda in Ico or Elizabeth
in Bioshock Infinite [31, 25]. AI sidekicks that can understand human intentions and
offer assistance are also critical for personal robotics. For instance, a robot that
understands that a human is trying to clean up after a meal may help out by washing
the dishes or drying and putting them away, whilst the human takes up the other
role.
1.1 Sidekicks in Games
Despite their successes in some games, the repertoire of autonomous unscripted be-
haviors for sidekick characters has been limited. To explore some of the reasons why,
we consider the case of a game where an AI sidekick was notably missing.
In the multiplayer mode of Lara Croft and the Guardian of Light (LCGL), devel-
opers Crystal Dynamics focused heavily on cooperative gameplay, with human players
taking on the roles of Lara Croft and Totec, the titular Guardian of Light [19]. In
single-player mode, however, the gameplay was completely changed to remove the
cooperative elements, including removing Totec as an independent character, rather
than implementing him as a sidekick character [14]. Crystal Dynamics' choice to com-
pletely change the game's design to circumvent the technical challenge of building a
controller for Totec is a testament to the difficulty of the sidekick problem, and the
capabilities that the controller would have required are a good example of the kinds
of problems that a sidekick would need to face in a modern video game.
There are two core elements of gameplay in LCGL: combat and navigational
puzzles. Combat involves navigating a three dimensional environment, viewed from
an isometric camera, avoiding enemy attacks, and attacking enemies with Lara and
Totec's weapons. Choosing the appropriate weapon, dodging attacks, and positioning
yourself are key to success. Coordinating with your ally is also important, since your
16
actions can adversely effect them, for instance by knocking them into a bad position
with an explosive, causing them to be surrounded by enemies. The dynamics of
combat are non-deterministic, with weapons doing a variable amount of damage,
enemy behaviors decided randomly, and game physics behaving unpredictably.
Navigational puzzles in LCGL's multiplayer mode involve combining Lara and
Totec's tools and abilities to get to hard-to-reach items or sections of a level. A simple
puzzle might involve Totec throwing a spear, which sticks in the wall, allowing Lara to
jump onto it and reach a ledge. From the ledge she can throw down a rope for Totec
to then climb up. More complex puzzles might involve pushing buttons, activating
switches, swinging on ropes, and avoiding boulders, often with the steps chained
together in a sequence and requiring timed coordination across different sections of a
room. Additionally, there may be multiple possible paths to solving the same puzzles,
each requiring Lara and Totec to coordinate in a different way.
During both combat and navigational puzzles, the game state is partially observ-
able on multiple levels, with unobservable elements including the map outside of the
player's camera view, the contents of containers such as breakable jars and barrels,
the parameters governing the behavior of enemies, and the causal relationship be-
tween items in the game, such as buttons, levers, and doors. Aside from the game
state, the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the players are also unobservable to one
another. This partial observability means that to act reasonably a sidekick would
need to keep track of its history of observations, such as where it last saw enemies
before they disappeared off the screen, and use them in its deliberations.
A controller for Totec would have to cope with the stochasticity of the game dy-
namics, the partial observability of the game environment, and, crucially, with the
unobservable intentions of the human player, to which it only has clues from the his-
tory of its observations of the player's actions. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, these
elements make games like LCGL examples of a particular class of problem, that can
17
formally be modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP).
Optimally solving POMDPs is a computationally intractable problem, so it is unsur-
prising that Crystal Dynamics shied away from the challenge.
1.2 Sequential Planning
Throughout this thesis we will be concerned with sidekick AI for sequential planning
problems, the simplest of which are fully observable. In a fully observable sequential
planning problem an agent is presented with the state of the world, which fully
describes every detail about the world which could be important for making a decision
about what to do, and is presented with a set of actions to choose from. Picking one
of these actions then causes the world state to change, via the world's state transition
dynamics, to another world state, in which the agent may pick another action, and so
on. State transitions may be stochastic, which the agent needs to take into account
when selecting its actions. In addition, after each transition between states, the agent
receives a reward signal that tells it how good the chosen action was. Stochastic
sequential planning problems are modeled by Markov decision processes (MDPs),
which we shall introduce formally in Section 2.3.
A solution to a stochastic sequential planning problem is called a policy. Policies
are sets of decision rules that pick an action based on the current state of the world. A
good policy is one that maximizes the expected rewards gained over time. Policies can
be stationary, meaning that they are constant over time, or non-stationary, meaning
that the decision rules can change on each time step. A policy can take many forms,
from an explicit mapping between states and actions, computed in a table, to a
dynamic procedure that produces an action on the fly for each state with which it is
presented. A procedure for finding a policy is called a planner and a procedure that
governs the execution of a policy is called a controller.
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Solving sequential planning problems involves reasoning about how an agent's
actions will affect the state of the world, but in a partially observable sequential
planning problem, an agent does not have direct access to the state of the world.
Instead, it receives a series of observations, such as readings from a robot's laser
rangefinder or a human collaborator's speech, that give it clues to what the true state
might be. This complicates matters, since the agent then needs to reason what to do,
given its history of observations and the actions that it has taken, without knowing
exactly what the true state is. This situation is modeled by partially observable
Markov decision processes, which we shall introduce in Section 2.4.
In both the fully and partially observable cases we are interested in building a
planner that is robust in the face of uncertainty. In the real world, actions often have
uncertain outcomes or have to be made with limited information.
Uncertain outcomes can take the form of pure chance, or represent the limits of
modeling fidelity, such as abstractly representing the possibility of a robot's wheel
slipping in mud, without fully representing the physics of the situation in the model.
Limited information stems from sensing failures, such as occluded vision, or in-
accuracies in a laser rangefinder's readings. For Al sidekicks, another key case of
limited information is in reasoning about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of their
colleagues. These internal mental states are unobservable by their very nature. A key
contribution of this thesis will be to present methods for reasoning about a collabo-
rator's unobserved intentions and planning in the face of uncertainty about them.
An agent can represent its current estimate of the state of the world as a probabil-
ity distribution over states, called a belief. Given a model of the domain's dynamics
and also of how the state of the world produces observations for the agent, the agent
can reason about how its actions will update its belief about the state of the world.
This kind of reasoning is called belief-space planning. In contrast to the fully observ-
able case, a policy for a partially observable sequential planning problem is a set of
19
decision rules mapping belief states, rather than world states, to actions.
This thesis focuses strongly on the case of video games, in which there is already a
rich tradition of AI sidekicks. Video games have the special benefit, which sets them
apart from real world robotics, of being embedded inside of virtual worlds which can
be made fully observable to an AI sidekick. Indeed, game developers often explicitly
reduce direct access to the state by AI characters in games, through modeling audio
and visual sensor dynamics within the game system in an attempt to generate more
believable behaviors from their AI and to give human players a sense of fairness. A
human collaborator's intentions, on the other hand, are not directly observable and
are an important hidden part of the state. We will consider both the case where the
human's intention is the only unobserved part of the state and the case where the
sidekick must cope with a more general form of partial observability.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis presents two major approaches to tackling the problem of building con-
trollers for Al sidekicks. We first formalize the AI sidekick problem in Chapter 2,
introducing decision-theoretic planning, and casting it as a POMDP. As part of this
formulation we discuss modeling human beliefs and goals, which is critical for the
subsequent two chapters. We also place our work within the context of existing lit-
erature on decision-theoretic planning, multi-agent systems, and current practices in
video game development.
In Chapter 3 we present an approach to the Al sidekick problem that makes use of
offline state-space planning for both constructing human models and planning actions.
To deal with partial observability, communication, and information gathering actions,
we introduce a range of heuristic methods that build on top of a state-space planning
framework. We then evaluate these methods experimentally on two domains, pairing
20
them with simulated humans.
Chapter 4 presents an alternative approach to the AI sidekick problem that plans
online in belief space using Partially Observable Monte Carlo Planning (POMCP),
which naturally handles partial observability, communication, and information gath-
ering actions. To improve the performance of POMCP, we introduce ensemble meth-
ods for parallelizing the search algorithm. We evaluate several varieties of POMCP
planning for the Al sidekick problem over three domains, again pairing them with
simulated humans.
We conclude in Chapter 5 by summarizing our key results and contributions and
proposing future directions for research.
21
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Chapter 2
The AI Sidekick Problem
There are two related capabilities that an effective controller for an AI sidekick must
have. The first is that it must be able to understand the intentions of its human
collaborator and the second is that it must be able to choose reasonable actions to
help the human, given its understanding of their intentions. An ideal sidekick should
also be able to combine these capabilities, so that it if it is uncertain about a human's
intentions, and the actions that it ought to take hinge critically upon knowing them,
then it should be able to choose actions that can help reveal information about those
intentions.
In addition, in many games a sidekick must cope with limited information not only
about human intentions, but also about the game world. For instance, a sidekick's
vision may be blocked by walls in the game world or limited by the size of the display
in the case of a top-down camera. Other entities in the world, such as enemies,
may also have hidden state that the sidekick has no access to, but must infer from
interacting with them.
The AI sidekick problem is that of building a controller that can choose actions
which help to support a human collaborator's intentions in the face of uncertainty
about those intentions and also about the true state of the environment. In this
23
chapter we will formalize this problem as a partially observable Markov decision
process, or POMDP. We will first introduce Cops and Robbers, a game that we will
use throughout this chapter in explaining the different parts of the POMDP model,
and that will also later serve as a test-bed for the sidekick controllers that we develop.
We will develop our POMDP formulation in two stages, first by considering the case
of trying to coordinate with a human player whose play strategy is known, and then
by considering the case where it must be inferred by the sidekick from some fixed set
of possibilities.
2.1 Cops and Robbers
In Cops and Robbers, shown in Figure 2-1, the human player and the sidekick are
cops, chasing robbers who are fleeing from them through the corridors of a building
full of twisting passages and one-way doors. The object of the game is to catch any
one of the robbers as quickly as possible, but it takes two cops to overpower a robber,
so the player and their sidekick must coordinate to corner and catch a robber. The
presence of one-way doors means the cops have to be careful about the routes they
take or they could find themselves wasting a lot of time if they go the wrong way.
From the perspective of the sidekick, the game state is fully observable, with the
exception of the human's intentions which it cannot directly observe.
The player's perspective is from a bird's eye view, with the positions of all of the
cops and robbers fully visible. The player and their sidekick take turns moving, with
the robbers moving after the sidekick. If there is a cop within two squares of them,
a robber will move in the direction that takes them furthest from the nearest cop,
breaking ties randomly. A key strategy for the game is to cut off robbers' escape
routes so that the two cops can trap them. To help coordinate this, the sidekick is
allowed to ask the player which robber they should aim for, but doing so spends a
24
turn for the sidekick to ask and for the human to respond.
Figure 2-1: The Cops and Robbers play field. The human is in the top right, the
sidekick is in the bottom left. Chevrons indicate the direction of one-way doors.
Cops and Robbers is a special domain for two reasons. Firstly, the task of catch-
ing each individual robber can be seen as a separate subgoal that can be pursued
completely independently of the other robbers. Secondly, assuming that the human
knows the rules of the game, believes that the sidekick both knows the human's in-
tentions, and also knows how the sidekick is trying to coordinate with them, then
from the human's perspective the game is fully observable. These two properties will
be particularly relevant in Chapter 3, where we introduce a planning approach that
takes advantage of them.
The one-way doors are a key feature of Cops and Robbers, since they accentuate
the importance of taking uncertainty about the human's intentions into account. If
the sidekick is over-eager in pursuing the wrong robber they may commit to going
through a door that prevents them from easily getting to the part of the maze con-
taining the human's real intended target. Although Cops and Robbers in principle
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allows for the game to be won by catching any robber, we assume that the human
would prefer to be in command, rather than being forced to follow the sidekick's
agenda, so it is undesirable for the sidekick to put the two of them into a position
where the human is forced to change targets.
2.1.1 Playing Cops and Robbers as the Sidekick
As an example of the kind of reasoning that we would ideally like a sidekick controller
to be able to perform, consider the situation in Figure 2-2a, with it being the human's
turn to move. Say that the sidekick was initially unsure which of the two robbers,
red or cyan, that the human is chasing. If the human were to move south, as shown
in Figure 2-2b, its target would remain ambiguous; it could be chasing either robber
and would still make the same move. After the human moves, it is the sidekick's turn
and it is faced with a choice of moving west to chase the cyan robber, moving east to
chase the red robber, or waiting. Note that moving west would cause the sidekick to
step through the one-way door on which it is standing, which would mean it would
have to take the long way around were the human in fact chasing red. As the sidekick
we might reason that waiting for the human to make its move first would be best,
since then we would have a clearer idea of their intentions. For instance, if we were to
pass and the human to move west as in Figure 2-2c, and we had faith that the human
was reasonably competent, then we could be confident that they were chasing the
cyan robber. Having seen them make that move, we could then safely step through
the one-way door and help them catch cyan.
The key point here is that in doing this kind of reasoning, we are reasoning about
our own belief about the human's hidden intentions, and about how our beliefs about
those intentions will change as we select actions. We reasoned that in choosing to
pass we would have more information with which to make a better-informed decision
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(a) Initial state. (b) Human moves south. (c) Sidekick passes, human
moves west.
Figure 2-2: Two rounds of moves in a game of Cops and Robbers.
on our next move and could avoid making a blunder. This kind of reasoning about
how our actions affect our beliefs is called belief-space planning.
Thinking about how our actions will affect our beliefs is particularly important
for reasoning about communication. For instance, if instead of passing, we directly
asked the human which robber they were chasing, we can reason that, assuming they
were cooperative, their response would almost certainly give us all the information
we needed about their intentions to be able to make a good decision about which
way to go. So we can conclude that asking a question is beneficial in that situation,
because it will allow us to update our belief about the human's intentions in a way
that lets us make good decisions in the future.
2.2 Multi-Agent Systems and Decision-Theoretic
Planning
Autonomous decision makers are often referred to as agents in the Al community.
The study of systems containing interacting agents is the field of multi-agent systems
(MAS) and as such, the Al sidekick problem, which focuses upon the interaction
between two agents, one being an Al and the other being a human, is a MAS prob-
lem. MAS is a broad and interdisciplinary field, involving researchers in psychology,
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economics, logic, philosophy and artificial intelligence. Since multi-agent systems
subsume single decision makers, to some extent the MAS field subsumes Al itself,
but MAS researchers are typically particularly concerned with issues such as how
teams of agents can organize themselves to act effectively in concert or adversarially,
communicate efficiently, and model each other's beliefs, desires, and intentions. In
this thesis we will restrict our discussion of the field to a particular tradition in MAS
based upon decision-theoretic planning. For a broader view of MAS, a number of
good introductory and survey texts exist [62, 59, 63].
Decision-theoretic planning is a paradigm for studying decision making with its
roots in operations research, control theory, and game theory. It is primarily con-
cerned with rational, optimal, sequential decision making, particularly in stochastic
and partially observable domains. Operations research typically studies decision-
making problems in the context of logistics and scheduling, whereas control theory
studies them in the context of continuous dynamical systems. Game theory deals
with decision making in the context of multiple, possibly adversarial, decision mak-
ers, and is often considered a separate field, but there are strong connections between
game theory and decision-theoretic planning, particularly when agents are interact-
ing repeatedly over time [46]. In contrast to the very general setting of game theory,
decision-theoretic approaches to multi-agent systems typically assume that the agents
are cooperative. Decision-theoretic planning has the virtue of formalizing the notion
of decision and plan quality, which distinguishes it from other approaches to decision
making in multi-agent systems.
The computational complexity of decision-theoretic planning depends heavily upon
the modeling of the planning problem. Throughout this thesis we will make a key
assumption, which is that the human will be acting according to some set of behav-
ior profiles that the sidekick knows in advance. The sidekick may not know which
particular behavior profile the human is following, but having a human model that
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captures these behaviors allows for planning actions that can help reveal which profile
the human is following and also assist them. This assumption makes the AI sidekick
problem a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). Optimal planning
for a POMDP is PSPACE-complete if we want to model games that run for a fixed
length of time and undecidable if there is no time limit [49, 42]. However, there are
a number of approximate planning techniques that we can use.
Requiring that we have an accurate human model is a strong assumption, but
relaxing this assumption makes the computational complexity of the problem much
more daunting. In the most general case, with no constraints on the kinds of expected
human behavior, and in particular with the human and the sidekick potentially having
different reward functions, then the problem is a partially observable stochastic game,
for which optimal planning is NEXPNP-hard [27]. A less extreme alternative is to
assume that the humans will act as if they had previously conferred with the sidekick
and come up with an optimal joint plan that respects the uncertainty of the domain,
in which case the problem is a decentralized partially observable Markov decision
process (Dec-POMDP), for which optimal planning is still NEXP-complete [6].
In our formulation we will not make any assumptions about whether the human
is in turn trying to model the sidekick, however there is a related formalism, the
finitely nested interactive POMDP, or I-POMDP, that explicitly models this possi-
bility. Agents in a finitely nested I-POMDP are modeled as having a level which
determines the degree of belief nesting that they will consider for each other agent in
the domain. The finite nesting stipulation enforces the constraint that agents model
other agents as having a strictly lower level than themselves, which guarantees that
their recursive beliefs about each other will ground out with an agent model that
does't model any other agents.
Finding exact an optimal policy for an I-POMDP is still PSPACE-complete for
finite horizons and undecidable for the infinite horizon case, as with all POMDPs [17].
29
State of the art approximation techniques for I-POMDP planning involve representing
and updating the agent's nested beliefs using nested particle filters and using value
iteration directly on this representation [18].
The human models that we will discuss in this thesis do not attempt to model
the sidekick's beliefs, and as such our overall setup is closely related to a level-one I-
POMDP, in which one agent models the internal state of the other, but not vice versa.
A richer set of human models that allowed for recursive reasoning about one-another's
beliefs could make fuller use of the I-POMDP formalism.
In the next section we will begin introducing the POMDP formalism, by consid-
ering the completely observable case, where the sidekick knows in advance precisely
what the human is planning to do, which makes the problem a completely observable
Markov decision process (MDP).
2.3 Markov Decision Processes
A Markov decision process is a formal model used in decision-theoretic planning with
their roots in the operations research community. They are used to model problems
in which an agent must choose a sequence of actions in interacting with a system
whose state updates probabilistically in response to the agent's actions. Games with
complete information, and particularly board games whose rules explicitly lay out
how the game state updates in response to player actions, are good examples of the
kinds of domains that can be modeled as MDPs. There is a rich body of research on
Markov decision processes and this thesis will only be able to touch on a small part
of it, but a more thorough discussion can be found in other texts [7, 52]. Figure 2-3
shows the structure of a system modeled by an MDP, whose components we will
discuss in detail.
At any given time, the system is in some particular state out of the set of possible
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Figure 2-3: An MDP models an agent's interaction with the world.
states, S. The random variable S', will represent the state of the system at time t. At
each time step, the agent interacting with the system must select an action from A,
the set of possible actions. The random variable A', will represent the action chosen
by the agent at time t. A rule for deciding which action to select at time t given
one's experiences up to t is called a policy and the challenge of planning is to find the
policy that selects the best such actions.
We will focus on the case where time is divided into discrete points at which
the agent is allowed to make decisions, although the MDP model can be applied to
the continuous time case, too, at the cost of additional complexity [7, 52]. For the
moment we will also only consider discrete states and actions, although when we turn
to POMDPs later we will discuss continuous state spaces.
Example: In Cops and Robbers, leaving aside the complication of the human's
internal state and intentions, a state is a complete configuration of the game,
meaning the positions of each of the robbers, the human, and the sidekick. S is
the set of all such configurations. A = {n, e, s, w, x, ?} is the set of movements
in each of the cardinal directions, the pass action, and the communication
action that asks the human for their target. Note that although Cops and
Robbers is a multi-player game, the problem we are solving is choosing sidekick
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actions, which is a single-player problem, so we are representing Cops and
Robbers as a system experienced specifically from the sidekick's perspective.
An MDP models how a system's states change over time in response to actions
via a transition function T : S x A --+ H(S), which maps state and action pairs to
a probability distribution over successor states. We will write T(s, a, s') = Pr(St+1 =
s'|t = s, At = a) to indicate the individual transition probabilities. Note that the
distribution over successor states depends only on the current state of the system and
the most recent action chosen by the agent. This is the eponymous Markov property
of the MDP. Almost all perfect-information games have this property, as do many
other domains.
Example: Consider the Cops and Robbers game state so, shown in Figure 2-
4a. We will again leave aside the human and communication actions for the
moment. If the sidekick chooses to move north, it will be within 2 spaces of
the red robber, causing it to flee. According to the rules of Cops and Robbers,
since the spaces immediately to the north and the west are tied for being
furthest from the sidekick, it will choose one of them to flee to uniformly at
random, so T(so, n, si) = 0.5 and T(so, n, s2) = 0.5. If the sidekick moves
south, the robber is not in range and won't try to flee, so T(So, s, s3) = 1.0. All
other actions lead to the sidekick standing still, out of range of the robber, so
for each of those actions a, T(so, a, so) = 1.0. Furthermore, these are the only
possible outcomes, so for every action a, T(so, a, s') = 0.0, where s' is not one
of the states previously mentioned.
In games, and many other domains, some states and actions are considered more
valuable than others. For instance, in chess the best possible state is one in which
your opponent is in checkmate and the best possible action is one which leads to
an inescapable checkmate. In other games, players may be trying to maximize their
score, and a good action is one that improves their score. A great action, on the
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(a) so (b) si
(c) s2  (d) S3
Figure 2-4: State transitions in a game of Cops and Robbers.
other hand, may be one that scores less
on. In other cases the reward may not
but rather some more abstract criteria,
satisfying internal desires.
now, but sets up strong scoring moves later
even be an explicit part of the game rules,
like coordinating well with other players or
To model the relative immediate value of starting in a given state of performing an
action and then making a transition to some other state, we use the reward function
lI : S x A x S --+ R, where the output is a real-valued reward signal. Since we will
often be interested chiefly in evaluating the quality of an action in a given state, we
introduce the function r : S x A --+ R which computes the expected immediate reward
33
of performing a in s,
r(s, a) = E 7r(s, a, s')7R(s, a, s'). (2.1)
SIES
Example: In Cops and Robbers the object of the game is to catch a robber
by both standing on the same square as it. Let us call all such states capture
states. There are several possible reward functions that could model this cri-
teria. One straightforward function is 7Z(s, a, s') = 1 only in the case where s'
is a capture state and 0 otherwise. Another possibility is that R(s, a, s') = 1
in the case where s is a capture state, and 0 otherwise. This alternative makes
sense if we model the game's ending as being a transition to an absorbing state
that occurs after a capture state. Finally, we could change either of these func-
tions to take into account the human's intentions, so that for a capture state
to result in a non-zero reward, it further requires that the captured robber was
the human's intended target.
Taken as a tuple, the states S, actions A, transition function T, and reward
function R constitute an MDP, M = (S, A, T, 7.). Solving an MDP means finding
a policy that selects actions sequentially such that they maximize some optimality
criterion. There a variety of possible criteria, of which we will focus on expected future
discounted reward. This criterion combines two key ideas. First, we are interested not
just in how good an action is immediately, but also in how taking an action will affect
the possibility of good outcomes in the future. Second, and somewhat counteracting
this first idea, is that although we care about our future rewards, we weigh the shorter
term future more heavily than the longer term future in our considerations.
We model this using a discount factor -y with a value in the range [0, 1] that
controls how strongly we favor short term rewards over long term ones. The expected
future discounted reward is then
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E 1 ytr(St, At) ,(2.2)
t=O
where T is the maximum number of steps or planning horizon. If we introduce the
additional constraint -y - 1, we can similarly compute the expectation for the infinite
horizon case
E Ytr(St, At) (2.3)
t=0
where this constraint ensures that the expectation will be bounded.
For some domains, 1 - -y can be interpreted as the probability that on each step
the game will end and enter a zero-reward absorbing state. In games domains this
could model some probability that the human decides to simply stop playing, so the
sidekick should be incentivized to have its actions pay off before the human quits.
Alternatively it can be seen as modeling a psychological bias towards short term
rewards.
Expected future discounted reward is just one of several possible optimality cri-
teria that can be applied in MDP models. Other possibilities include maximizing
immediate rewards or mean lifetime rewards. A fuller account of these kinds of cri-
teria can be found elsewhere [7, 52].
2.3.1 Modeling Humans
So far we have put aside discussion of the human's internal state and actions. The
strategy that we will use in this chapter for formulating a tractable multi-agent system
model is to treat the human's state as a part of the system's state and both the choice
and effects of their actions as part of the transition function. Figure 2-5 shows the
structure of the human model in the fully observable MDP case.
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Figure 2-5: Human model structure in an MDP.
The human's state is a part of the system external to the sidekick, but we want
to distinguish between the part of the system's state that represents the human and
that which represents the rest of the system. Let B be the set of such human states
and the random variable B' represent the human's state at time t. Similarly, let A be
the set of possible human actions and the random variable At represent the human's
action at time t. Let S then be the set of states excluding the human's state and St
be the corresponding random variable representing the state at time t. We can then
write the full state St as the tuple (St, Bt). Relatedly, we will be interested in the
intermediate state of the world immediately after the sidekick has acted, but before
the human has acted, again, excluding the human's internal state. Let 5 be the set
of such states and St be the corresponding random variable representing the state at
time t.
We will separate out the effects of sidekick and human actions into multiple steps.
The dynamic Bayesian network in Figure 2-6 shows the causal relationship between
the different variables involved. The thin dotted lines indicate the functions discussed
in this section that are responsible for updating the variables. The thick dashed lines
indicate the set of steps modeled by the complete transition function.
The first step, T : S x A -+ H(S), models the probabilistic effect of the sidekick's
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Figure 2-6: The transition function displayed as a dynamic Bayesian network for the
MDP case.
actions on state of the world, excluding the human's internal state. We write
Ts (s, a, s) = Pr(5t = 9 ISt = (9, b), At = a) (2.4)
= Pr(St = 919' = 9, At = a) (2.5)
for the individual probabilities. Note b has no causal influence on this update, so it
can be eliminated from the conditional.
The human's internal state is updated stochastically at each time step by the
internal update function A : S x P x A -* H(B). We write 6(9, b, a, ') = Pr(Bt+1
'5 ISt= 9, Bt = b, At = d) to indicate the individual transition probability.
After updating its internal state according to A, the human then stochasti-
cally selects an action based on its current state and its policy, i- : H - (A).
This policy represents a behavior profile or decision-making process that guides
the human's actions, given its current beliefs, desires, and intentions. We write
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m(b, a) = Pr(At+l = aI3t+l = b) to indicate the individual action probabilities.
Here the time is t + 1 because the time step is relative to the sidekick's decisions.
Finally, Th : S x A -- H(S) models the effects of the human's actions on the state.
We write -r(s, a, s) = Pr(St+l = |5' = 9, At+ = c) for the corresponding individual
transition probabilities.
A fully observable human model is then the tuple of human states, internal update
function, and policy H = (B, A, t). Given this formulation of the human model and
transition functions, r can be written:
r((S, b), a, (9', b')) = -r(, a, )6(g, b, d, b') E m(b', d')Trh(g, d', g'). (2.6)
zEs d'el
An important consequence of this formulation is that the sidekick's selected action
must be recorded as part of the state so that it can be used in the next time-step's
state update.
Example: Consider a possible human model for Cops and Robbers. Say that
the human had decided on a strategy of chasing the closest robber at each time
step, breaking ties between robbers and equally good actions by some arbitrary
ordering, and relying on the sidekick to plan around that strategy. We can
model a human following this strategy by letting 3 be the set of intentions to
chase each individual robber: 6(9, 6, e, V') = 1 if 6' is the intention to chase the
robber closest to the human in 9 and 0 otherwise. Additionally, m(b, d) = 1 if
d, is the action that moves the human closest to the robber and 0 otherwise.
Formulating the human model in this way makes two key assumptions. The first is
that we can actually know A and t for a domain. This is critical, and an assumption
that we will carry across to the partially observable case. This assumption means
that we know how the human's beliefs, desires, and intentions evolve over time in
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response to changes in the game state, how their decision making process works, and
how the human will respond to the sidekick's actions. The alternative would be to fall
back on a game theoretic analysis that considers all the human's possible responses,
which makes the problem far more difficult to both formulate and solve.
This is a strong assumption, since for many domains there is no intuitively obvi-
ous model of human action. In Chapter 3 we will present one possible method for
automatically generating human models, but as we will see, this method has limits.
In many cases, human models will have to either be hand engineered, or possibly
learned from data.
There are several possible interpretations of what this assumption means. One
possibility is that the human told the sidekick in advance exactly how they were
planning to behave. This is similar to the interpretation of Dec-POMDP planning
that assumes agents will mutually agree on a strategy that they are going to jointly
execute, with the key difference that the human unilaterally declares their plan and
forgoes any option to change their mind after telling the sidekick. This means that
planning from the sidekick perspective will be a search for an optimal response to
a fixed human strategy, rather a search for strategy that is jointly optimal for the
human and the sidekick. Another possibility is that the model could represent some
ideal human that the sidekick is expecting to be playing with, or even sub-optimal
human players whose deficiencies the sidekick expects it may have to make up for.
The idea here is that the model is not expected to exactly match the actual human,
but the hope is that, given the assumptions that the sidekick makes about the real
human's behavior based on the model, the sidekick will be able to plan reasonable
actions, even if the model doesn't exactly match reality.
The second assumption is that the sidekick has direct access to the human's cur-
rent beliefs, desires, and intentions. This makes the planning problem much easier,
because the sidekick doesn't have to consider the case that it might be confused or
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wrong about what the human wants. We will relax this assumption and consider the
partially observable case in Section 2.4.
2.3.2 Solving MDPs
Having formulated the AI sidekick problem as an MDP in this way, with the human
model forming part of the MDP dynamics, we could then apply standard MDP so-
lution techniques to solve the MDP and find an optimal policy for the sidekick in
the fully observable case. We could then use the policy as a controller for the side-
kick. This would be an appropriate thing to do if there could be no doubt as to the
human's beliefs, desires, and intentions, so modeling uncertainty about the human's
internal state would be unnecessary. We will also be using these solution methods in
our approximate methods for approaching POMDPs in Chapter 3.
2.3.2.1 Policies
The most general form of a policy is a mapping of state-action histories to actions. It
constitutes a plan for what action an agent ought to take, given any possible sequence
of interactions with a system. In the case of a fully observable MDP, it can be shown
that optimal behavior can be achieved even if only the current state is considered
when selecting an action, and the rest of the history is ignored [52]. A policy that
takes advantage of this property is called a Markov policy. The policy that when
followed maximizes the optimality criteria for the MDP, which in our case is expected
future discounted reward, is called a solution to the MDP. Finding such a policy is
called solving the MDP and the optimal policy itself is denoted lr*. In general, an
MDP may have multiple solutions.
The structure of a Markov policy for an MDP differs depending on whether the
MDP is finite horizon or infinite horizon. A decision rule for time t is a function
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dt : S -- A that maps a state to an action when there are t steps remaining. In the
finite horizon case a policy 7r = (dT, dT-1, ..., di) is made up of a sequence of decision
rules, one for each time step. A policy with this form is called a non-stationary policy,
because the decision rule that applies changes over time.
In the infinite horizon case, a Markov policy can be written in the form 7r =
(d, d, ...) with the same decision rule being used at every step, indicated by the lack of
a subscript. Such a policy is called a stationary policy. It can be proven that for any
infinite horizon MDP, there is a stationary policy that is optimal [52]. We will use 7r
to represent both stationary and non-stationary policies. Whenever there might be
confusion, we will draw an explicit distinction between the two.
2.3.2.2 Value Functions and Q-Functions
A key conceptual tool in solving MDPs is the value function of a policy, V" : S - R,
which maps a state to the expected reward of starting in that state and selecting
actions according to that policy. We will write VJ (s), with the t subscript for a finite
horizon policy, to indicate the expected discounted future reward, or value for short,
of starting in state s and following policy ir when there are t time steps remaining.
This value can be specified recursively with the equations
V7(s)=
VJ"(s) = r(s, dr(s)) + 7 1 r(s, dr(s), s')V'_1 (s'). (2.7)
sIES
which is known as the Bellman equation for the MDP and can be computed efficiently
using dynamic programming [5].
We will often be interested in a related function, Qr : S x A -* R. Q7(s, a), with
the subscript t, is the expected value of taking action a in state s with t steps left to
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go and following 7r from that point on. It is given by the equation
Q"(s, a) =0
Q'"(s, a) = r(s, a) + y r(s, a, s')V,_1(s'). (2.8)
In the infinite horizon case, the time dependency is removed, and the equations
become simply
V'(s) = r(s, d(s)) + -y E r(s, d(s), s')V'(s') (2.9)
S/ ES
and
Q*(s, a) = r(s, a) + -rZ(s, a, s')V'(s'). (2.10)
S'ES
An important property of the value function of the optimal policy, V*, is that it
is possible to recover the 7r* from the value function using one step of lookahead. For
the finite horizon case, if there are t steps remaining, then
7r*(s) = argmax r(s,.a)+ y r(s,a,s')V,(s') (2.11)
a SIES
Similarly, we can substitute the identity in Equation 2.8 to write
7r*(s) = argmax Q*(s, a) (2.12)
aEA
which explicitly shows the relationship between Q* and r*. The infinite horizon case
removes the time indexing in both equations.
An important consequence of this property is that if we can compute V*, then we
can use it to build an optimal controller by selecting actions according to lr*. One of
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the best known techniques for computing V*, from Bellman's seminal work on MDPs,
is value iteration [5].
2.3.2.3 Value Iteration
The core idea behind value iteration in the finite horizon case is to use dynamic
programming to exploit the recursive definition of V by first computing VO* and then
iteratively using V* to compute Vt,. Algorithm 2.1 solves for V* in this manner.
We use an explicit computation of Q* to demonstrate how it can be computed in the
process of performing value iteration.
Algorithm 2.1 Calculate V* - Finite horizon
1: for all s E S do
2: V*(s) <- 0
3: end for
4: for all t 1, ... ,T - 1, T do
5: for alls ESdo
6: for allaE Ado
7: Q*(s, a) <- r(s, a) + -y T(s, a, s')V* 1(s')
s'ES
8: end for
9: V*(s) +- max Q*(s, a)
aEA
10: end for
11: end for
12: return V
A similar approach can also be applied in the infinite horizon case, with the caveat
that the removal of time indexing on the value function means that, rather than Vt*
being built up recursively from V*1, we are instead searching for a V* that converges
as the number of iterations of the algorithm increases.
Algorithm 2.2 finds an -approximation of V* for an infinite horizon MDPs. In
general, there is guaranteed to be some c for which 7r* and the policy computed
from the E-approximation in this way are the same. The number of steps of value
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Algorithm 2.2 Calculate c-approximate V* - Infinite horizon
X <- 00
for all s E S do
V*(s) +- 0
end for
while x > c do
for all s E S do
for all a E A do
Q*(s, a) +- r(s, a) + -y E r (s, a, s')V*(s')
St'ES
end for
V'(s) <- max Q*(s, a)
a
end for
x <- max IV*(s) - V'(s)l
end while
return V*
iteration required to compute this approximation is polynomially bounded by the size
of the MDP's representation and the effective horizon, n!,; however to know that this
approximation is optimal requires that the appropriate value of E be known [41]. A
discussion of the convergence behavior of value iteration can be found elsewhere [52].
In practice, Algorithm 2.2 is typically run until E is smaller than some arbitrary small
threshold or some iteration limit is reached.
Value iteration is just one of several possible approaches to solving MDPs. An-
other popular approach is policy iteration, which finds a series of policies with in-
creasing quality by alternating steps of policy improvement and value function com-
putation [30].
Ultimately however, we are not interested in MDP solution techniques in and
of themselves. Rather, we are interested in how they can be used to approach the
problem of dealing with a human whose beliefs, desires and intentions are unknown
to the sidekick, a topic which we will discuss in Chapter 3. More generally still, we
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are interested in the case where the whole domain is only partially observable to both
the sidekick and the human, which we now turn to.
2.4 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
Partial observability is inevitable in the physical world and arises frequently in games.
In card games, the cards serve both to randomize and hide the complete state of
the game. In first-person video games, walls and other occluding obstacles block a
player's vision. Computer-controlled adversaries in video games often have internal
state governing their behavior that is not directly observable to a player. These
are all examples of partial observability in the game state. The presence of human
collaborators and their hidden internal beliefs, desires, and intentions adds another
source of partial observability. In this section we will introduce partially observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs), which extend the MDP model to account for
hidden state.
Like an MDP, a POMDP models a system whose state updates over time in
response to an agent's actions. In contrast to the fully observable case, however,
the state is not directly accessible to the agent. Instead, at each time step the
agent receives one of the set of possible observations, Z, from the system. The
random variable Z' will represent the observation received by the agent at time t.
Observations are generated by the system, possibly stochastically, in response to an
agent's actions and the underlying state of the system. This process is modeled by
the observation function 0 : A x S -- II(Z), which maps the agent's action at time
t - 1, and the state of the system at time t to a distribution over observations. Note
that this process is Markovian, the observations depend only on the current state and
most recent action. We write o(a, s, z) = Pr(Z' = zIAtl = a, St = s) to indicate the
individual observation probabilities.
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Example: Cops and Robbers is a domain in which the only partial observ-
ability stems from the human's internal state. Here Z is the set of game
states, not including the human's beliefs, desires, and intentions, and 0 is a
deterministic function that projects the full state into this form, without the
sidekick's actions having an influence on the observation. Robotics domains
often use stochastic observation functions to model the robot's sensor systems.
In these domains Z is the set of all possible sensor readings and 0 models the
functioning of the sensors.
In Section 2.3.2.1 we noted that for fully observable MDPs, knowledge of the
current state is sufficient for a policy to select an optimal action. Since the current
state is unknown in a POMDP, policies must have a different form. In this thesis
we will discuss two possibilities. One is a mapping from the set of action-observation
histories R to actions, 7r : H -+ A. An action-observation history is time-ordered
sequence of actions selected by and observations received by an agent. This policy
form is useful for the search-based approach that we will use in Chapter 4 and will
be discussed there in greater detail.
The other form exploits the fact that the Markovian dynamics of the transition and
observation model allow us to compute a probability distribution over the system's
state, which is a sufficient statistic for the history. This posterior distribution is called
a belief state, or information state, and B = I(S) is the set of all such belief states.
Since a belief state is a sufficient statistic for the history, this allows us to write a
policy in the form 7r : B -+ A. Note that this may be a more compact representation
than 7r : N -- A, since many different histories may be summarized by the same
belief state.
The problem of building a POMDP controller, shown interacting with a partially
observable system in Figure 2-7, can be decomposed into two parts; the state esti-
mator, SE that computes the belief-state update every time step, and the policy, 7r,
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Figure 2-7: A POMDP models an agent's interaction with a partially observable
world.
that selects an action, given the current belief state. We can derive SE using Bayes'
rule and the probabilities defined in the POMDP model. Let ba be the belief state
reached by starting in belief state b, executing action a, and receiving observation z.
b; (s'), the probability assigned to state s' by this new belief, can be derived
b(S') =r P(s' b, a, z)
Pr(s', b, a, z)
Pr(b, a, z)
Pr(zIs', b, a) Pr(s'lb, a) Pr(b, a)
Pr(z b, a) Pr(b, a)
Pr(z s', a) Pr(s' b, a)
Pr(zlb, a, s, s") Pr(s, s"Ib, a)
Pr(zls', a) s Pr(s'lb, a, s) Pr(s b, a)
E , Pr(zla, s") Pr(s"Ib, a, s) Pr(sb, a)
Pr(zls', a) Es Pr(sla, s) Pr(sb)
Is,,Pr(zla, s") Pr(s'lla, s) Pr(s~b)
o(a, s', z) , T(s, a, s')b(s) (2.13)
wSS,, O(a // , s z)r(s, a, sn)b(s)'
where the final step, Equation 2.13, is obtained by substituting in the observation
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and transition function identities.
A range of methods for computing optimal policies for POMDPs make use of the
fact that the belief-state dynamics can be used to formulate a POMDP as a continuous
state belief-state MDP. The idea is to treat the POMDP as an MDP in belief space,
where the states are the belief states and both the actions and discount factor remain
the same, but the transition probabilities and immediate reward functions are derived
as follows:
Let the conditional probability of receiving some observation z given that the
agent took action a and was in belief state b be
o-(b, a, z) = Pr(zlb, a)
= S b(s)r(s, a, s')o(a, s', z). (2.14)
Sts
We can then rewrite Equation 2.13 more compactly as
a o(a, s, z) E,, T(s', a, s)b(s')
z a-(b, a, z)
The final belief-space transition probability of reaching belief-state b' given that
the agent's current belief state is b and that it took action a is then
?/(b, a, b') = 5 -(b, a, z)I(b', ba), (2.16)
z
where I is the indicator function
I(x, y) = { ifoth=ey (2.17)
0 otherwise
Equation 2.16 gives us the belief-state transition function that we need for a belief-
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state MDP. The final element is the immediate reward function on belief states, Q,
constructed from the reward on regular states, which is
q(b, a) = Z b(s)r(s, a). (2.18)
SES
A psychological interpretation of this function is that an agent receives reward
for believing itself to be in a good state. An alternative interpretation is that this
function gives the true expected reward to the agent of being in belief state b and
taking action a.
Taken as a tuple, the belief states B, actions from the fully observable MDP A,
belief-state transition function 0, and reward function p constitute an continuous-
state MDP, B = (B, A, 4, p), which in principle can be solved to find r*.
2.4.1 Human Models with Partial Observability
We must adapt our human model for partially observable domains to account for
the fact that the human also may not have direct access to the world state and
that the sidekick does not have access to the human's internal state. Figure 2-8
shows the structure of the human model in the partially observable case. Note that
the model parallels the general POMDP controller. The key difference between this
model and the model from Section 2.3.1 is that the human receives observations
rather than states. A human model may use these observations in a number of ways,
from maintaining a complete action-observation history in their internal state, or
summarizing such a history with a belief state that can be used in action selection,
to simply reacting to the most recent observation.
The dynamic Bayesian network in Figure 2-9 shows the causal relationship be-
tween the different variables involved. The thin dotted lines indicate the functions
that are responsible for updating the variables. The thick dashed lines indicate the
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Figure 2-8: The structure of the POMDP human model.
set of steps modeled by the complete transition function.
I - I -
as a T
Figure 2-9: The transition function displayed as a dynamic Bayesian network for the
POMDP case.
Let Z, be the set of possible observations that the human can receive. The
random variable 2' will represent the observation received by the human at time t.
Similarly to the case of the sidekick, ( : A x A x S -- II(Z) models how the human
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probabilistically receives observations from the world, based on the current world
state and the last actions of the human and sidekick. We write 6(d, a, 9, f) = Pr(Z' =
,IA' = a, At = a, 5' = 9) to indicate the individual observation probabilities.
As mentioned, the human's internal transition function changes in this setting to
be A : B x A x Z -* 1(B), which models the human's internal state updating at time
t +1 after having taken an action and received an observation at time t. We write the
individual transition probabilities as 6(b, d, f, b') = Pr(B'tl = b'IB' = , = , Zt =
f). Note that b could be a belief state or action-observation history, or it could be
some other model of the human's beliefs, desires, and intentions; in most cases it will
not be directly observable by the sidekick.
T, and Th remain unchanged from the fully observable case. Recall from sec-
tion 2.3.1 that it is important to include the human's previous action as a part of
the state in order to be able to compute A correctly. This also holds for 0, which
likewise requires the human's previous action.
A partially observable human model is then the tuple of human states, observa-
tions, observation function, internal update function, and policy H = (B, Z, 0, A, r).The
transition probabilities for the sidekick POMDP can then be written:
T((9, b), a, (9', b')) = E T,(9, a, 9) E (d, a, 9, 2)
2EZ
6(b, d, f, ')J M (Y', d') h(9, d', 9'). (2.19)
'EA
2.4.2 Solving POMDPs
With the complete formulation of the sidekick POMDP we can now consider solution
methods. Solving an MDP can be done in polynomial time, with the caveat that
the size of the problem itself scales exponentially with the number of state variables.
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The move to partial observability, however, makes solving finite horizon POMDPs
PSPACE-hard and uncomputable for infinite horizon POMDPs [41]. The infinite
horizon case should not deter us too much, since in general we would be content
with a solution for finite, albeit very large, horizon POMDP. The PSPACE-hardness
result is, however, a major obstacle to the practical application of POMDP solutions
in games.
The transformation of a POMDP into a belief-state MDP allows for variations on
value iteration for computing exact solutions. One challenge is that the continuous
space could make even representing the value function required for one step of value
iteration an intractable problem; however, by leveraging the piecewise-linear and
convex properties of a POMDP's value function, it is possible to use finite sets of
vectors to represent the function and to approximate it to arbitrary precision or
even exactly in the finite horizon case [12]. A variety of exact solution techniques
leverage this property and have been compared theoretically and empirically, but are
intractable for most games domains [58, 13, 11].
Given that exact solution methods are intractable, we must turn to approximate
methods. A variety of approximate planning techniques for POMDPs exist based on
different forms of value function approximation, a comprehensive survey of which can
be found in [29].
The starting point from which we build our approximation techniques is a decision-
theoretic model of assistance introduced by Fern et al. [22, 23]. As we have done,
this body of work modeled the sidekick problem as a POMDP. Unlike our model
however, they used a special purpose formulation which assumed that the POMDP
had a special structure, such that the only hidden state of the world was the human's
internal state. They proposed learning the dynamics of their human model from
observed data over time, but bootstrapping the learning process by assuming that
initially the human acts as if it were perfectly coordinating with the sidekick to
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achieve its goal. This assumption allowed them to build a human model by using
value iteration. For solving the POMDP itself they used approximate methods based
on the value function of the underlying MDP. This technique was applied to games
domains in the CAPIR planning framework introduced by Nguyen et al. [45]. A
variant of this framework was applied by the Singapore-MIT GAMBIT Game Lab
in the game Dearth, a cooperative puzzle game that prominently featured an Al
sidekick [38]. We will develop it further in Chapter 3, exploring extensions to allow
for communication and information gathering.
One popular set of more general-purpose approaches to POMDP solving use point-
based methods which sample points in belief space, compute the value function at
those points via value iteration, and use them to form a value function estimate,
such as PBVI [50] and SARSOP [37]. By contrast, policy search methods construct
compact policy representations, such as finite state controllers, and perform gradient
ascent on the value function by trying various policy modifications and accepting
the change that best improves the value function [2]. In a recent planning compe-
tition, the most successful planner combined SARSOP with the POMCP algorithm,
which combines value function estimation from Monte Carlo simulation with particle
filtering for representing beliefs [57]. A similar strategy using approximations from
state-space planning has also shown success in cooperative planning in teams with
unknown team mates [4]. These results make POMCP a promising candidate for
attacking the Al sidekick problem, which we will explore in Chapter 4.
2.5 Al in Games
Planning in games has been a fruitful field of research for Al researchers since early in
the discipline. The broadest class of successful approaches for adversarial games has
combined variations on minimax search with linear function approximation to search
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as deep as possible into the tree of state-action sequences and then approximate the
value of the states reached from features of these states. This approach has led to
super-human performance in a variety of games including chess [10]. An extreme
case is checkers, which has been solved via a combination of minimax search and an
exhaustive lookup table of end game positions [55]. For the most part, planning in
games has focused on creating strong computer opponents, rather than assistants.
Of particular interest for domains with large state spaces, such as the Al sidekick
problems with which we are concerned, is recent work on the game of Go. Through
combining techniques for minimizing regret on multi-armed bandit problems, ideas
from traditional minimax search, value function approximation through Monte Carlo
estimates, and heuristic methods for bootstrapping the value function approxima-
tions, computer Go players are now competitive with the most accomplished human
players on 9x9 boards and are reaching a competitive level on full sized boards [26].
The general framework of combining an exploration policy for selecting actions within
a search tree of previously seen states and actions with Monte Carlo estimates of the
value function formed from random interactions with a simulation of the domain dy-
namics, called rollouts, is Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) [15]. The most common
choice of exploration policy is the UCB1 algorithm, which combined with uniform
random action selection for rollouts gives the UCT algorithm [36].
Numerous variations on these techniques have been demonstrated with good suc-
cess across games domains, a comprehensive survey of which can be found else-
where [9]. As of June 2013, the dominant system in general game playing, which
tests the ability of AI agents to play previously unseen games, is the MCTS-based
system Cadiaplayer [8]. POMCP, mentioned in 2.4.2, extends the MCTS framework
to partially observable domains and was used in the winning entry of the 2011 ICAPS
probabilistic planning competition [54].
Researchers in academia have largely focused their efforts on developing AI that
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competes in adversarial games at a high level. By contrast, game designers and Al
programmers in the video games industry have been more concerned with developing
AI that gives a compelling gameplay experience whilst using relatively few computa-
tional resources. The ideal Al opponent from a commercial games perspective offers
the human an enjoyable but beatable challenge and the ideal sidekick Al is an helpful
companion whose primary virtues are that the player forms an emotional connection
with them and that they don't get in the way.
Game AI uses a heterogenous toolkit of techniques to drive Al behavior in games.
Some prevalent techniques include finite state machines, A* search, artificial poten-
tial fields, utility-based systems, and domain-specific languages for behavior scripting.
Animation selection and blending techniques are also typically closely linked with
behavior selection. Game companies are often protective of their proprietary technol-
ogy, but some notable AI programmers have recently published textbooks covering
the major techniques involved in building Al systems for games [56, 43, 44].
In first-person video games in particular there are two prevalent techniques for
controlling AI behavior. The first is behavior trees, which combine some of the prop-
erties of decision trees and finite state machines, giving designers a domain-specific
graphical language for manually specifying how individual behaviors are triggered
by an AI's sensors and are sequenced [32]. Behavior trees were developed for the
Halo series, first being used in Halo 2, and have since become a standard technique
across games, spreading beyond first-person games [61]. Interviews with developers
on the recently released games Bioshock Infinite and The Last of Us [25, 16], both of
which prominently feature sidekick AI, have suggested that their sidekick character
controllers were built using a combination of behavior trees and utility-based reason-
ing, but in keeping with the secretive nature of the industry, neither of the studios,
Irrational Games and Naughty Dog, have officially confirmed this or released a white
paper.
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The second technique is goal-oriented action planning (GOAP), which first ap-
peared in the F.E.A.R. series and has since been used in a number of other titles,
but is less prevalent than behavior trees [48, 51]. GOAP uses a highly optimized
STRIPS-like planning system to allow Al characters to autonomously plan sequences
of actions to achieve their goals. This style of planning contrasts with decision-
theoretic planning, in that there is no notion of a general reward function, but rather
some goal state that the Al is trying to reach and a series of available operators that
it must sequence together to reach that goal state. This approach has been extended
into a hierarchical planning setting in the Killzone series, in which the AI characters
plan using hierarchical task networks (HTNs), combining the hierarchical structure
of behavior trees with the planning-based approach of GOAP [60, 24].
These two approaches contrast in where development effort is located. In behavior
trees the effort is in specifying how to select and carry out appropriate actions, whereas
in GOAP and HTN planning it is in specifying a domain model that describes how
actions affect the world. Both can require domain insights on the part of designers
and engineers to produce good behavior. In many games the rules themselves will
specify the domain model, and in particular the transition function, which is a point
in favor of the latter approaches, but this is not true of all games. For example,
modern computer games often use sophisticated physics simulations that implicitly
specify a transition function, but whose effects cannot easily be expressed explicitly.
Even if the model is available, the state space, action set, or transition function may
be too large or complex for the planner to reason with, so developers must instead
design abstractions for the planner, which is a domain engineering challenge in itself.
As things stand, behavior trees are wider spread, but neither approach has proven a
clear winner among developers.
Our decision-theoretic approach falls in the same camp as GOAP and HTN plan-
ning, requiring domain modeling effort to formulate the system of game and human as
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a POMDP. As we shall see, the state-space complexity concerns that lead the games
industry to use abstract domain models for GOAP and HTN planning will become
apparent even for the relatively simple games that we will investigate and will prove
to be a challenge. On the other hand, the key strength of our approach is that it
provides a way of reasoning about how to take human intentions into account when
planning, which is something that GOAP and HTN planning do not address.
In the next chapter we present a method for sidekick planning using our decision-
theoretic POMDP model that uses state-space planning to approximate a solution to
the POMDP.
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Chapter 3
State-space Planning for Sidekicks
3.1 Introduction
Having formulated the Al sidekick problem as a POMDP, we are now faced with the
challenge of finding a controller for the sidekick. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the
general problem of solving POMDPs optimally is PSPACE hard for finite-horizon
problems and uncomputable for infinite horizon problems. For a practical approach
we must trade off optimality for tractability by adopting heuristic solutions. How-
ever, we will still use the power of the POMDP representation and decision-theoretic
planning to motivate these heuristic methods.
The approach in this chapter is to use standard state-space planning techniques
to build a heuristic POMDP controller. The key idea is that if the sidekick had an
oracle that allowed it to observe the full world state directly, including the human's
intentions, it would be able to transform the POMDP into an MDP, solve for the
optimal policy of the MDP, and then act according to the policy. As mentioned in
Chapter 2, finding an optimal MDP solution can be done in polynomial time, which
is a vast improvement on PSPACE-completeness, with the caveat that the size of the
problem scales exponentially with the number of state variables.
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The trade off in this approach is that the policy for any MDP will not take into
account the sidekick's uncertainty about the true state of the world in its planning,
including its collaborators' goals, since the MDP formulation implies that the sidekick
knows the internal state of its collaborators exactly.
Our approach to building a controller for the sidekick involves four components,
labeled in Figure 3.1.
1. A human model H representing the decision process of the human collabo-
rator, with separate behavior profiles for each of the human's possible goals,
constructed using state-space planning.
2. A state estimator implemented as a recursive Bayes filter that
sidekick's belief state given its actions and observations.
3. The value function, VMDP, for the fully observable version of the
problem.
4. A policy that selects an action, given the sidekick's current belief
porating VLDP'
z
updates the
AI assistant
state, incor-
a2
Figure 3-1: The four components of the state-space planning approach.
The key shortcoming of using state-space planning to evaluate actions is that it
assumes that the sidekick has full information about the world, so it will never select
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actions solely for gathering information. To make this clear, consider a simple game in
which a contestant must pick between one of two opaque boxes, one of which contains
a pot of gold, whilst the other contains nothing. We will apply the planning method
outlined above. To transform this game into an MDP, we must make the assumption
that there is no hidden state, so the position of the gold is completely known and
the optimal state-space policy says simply to pick the box with the gold in it. Since
the contestant doesn't in fact know the exact state of the world, they must rely on
the Bayes filter to tell them which box the gold is in so that they can execute the
MDP policy. Since their initial belief about the gold's location should weight each
possibility equally in the absence of any other information, the contestant would be
left with no better policy overall than picking at random, which is indeed the optimal
policy. However, consider how things change if the contestant could pay a penny to
be told exactly where the pot of gold is. The optimal policy for the MDP in this
modified set up is exactly the same as for the original case, because why would you
want to pay a penny if you already knew exactly where the pot is? The problem is
that MDP policies will always be too optimistic and discount the value of information,
because they assume a fully observable world.
To combat this shortcoming we introduce a range of heuristic approaches to the
problem of deciding whether to take information-gathering actions at execution time,
which make use of MDP value functions and policies computed by offline planning.
These approaches stand in contrast to the approach in Chapter 4, which instead
plans directly in belief space, by reasoning directly about how information-gathering
actions will affect the sidekick's belief state. Here though, since we simplify the
planning problem by setting aside the issue of partial observability, we should expect
that planning will be more efficient, albeit with a limit to how well our policy can
ever hope to perform.
Finally, for certain kinds of domains, the state-space planning approach offers a
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ready answer to the question of how one can automatically build a human model to
be used in the POMDP formulation. There are two conditions for this. The first is
that we can characterize the set of possible goals or desires that the human may have
by a family of reward functions, one for each such specific goal or desire. The second
is that the only unobserved state variables in the domain are the internal state of the
human.
Given these conditions, we can formulate a set of fully observable MDPs, one for
each reward function, in which we assume that both the sidekick and the human
have full access to the human's internal state. We can then solve each of these
MDPs for joint policies for the human and the sidekick using state-space planning.
These joint policies represent the optimal strategies for the human and the sidekick to
coordinate under the assumption of full observability. The human's half of these joint
policies can then be used to build human models, representing a human acting under
the assumption that the sidekick fully understands their intentions and is trying to
coordinate optimally with them.
The approach to the AI sidekick problem discussed in this chapter builds upon
previous work by Fern et al., who developed a decision-theoretic model of assistance
that used the same basic strategy for building human models outlined here, although
our formulation is somewhat more general in that we allow for a range of control
strategies that attempt to reason about how to mitigate the sidekick's uncertainty
about human intentions [22]. They also integrated a learning component for refining
human models from experience, which we do not address here, but which would be a
possible extension.
Nguyen et al. applied this model of assistance in a games domain, developing
a system called CAPIR, which also incorporated a model of task switching that we
generalize in our human model's internal update function [45]. The CAPIR framework
consists of a specific set of design choices covered in this chapter. It uses a domain-
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specfic decomposition of the game into sub-games representing the human's possible
subgoals and solves them using value iteration to build a human model, it assumes
that humans switch subgoals with a fixed probability on each time step, and it uses
the QMDP rule for action selection.
Our contribution to this body of work is to extend this model of assistance by
introducing action selection techniques that reason about the sidekick's belief state
and can select information gathering actions, which the previous two approaches
were incapable of. This allows for us to incorporate communication and question
asking into the sidekick's repertoire of actions, as well as all allowing for more subtle
reasoning about the effects of regular actions on the sidekick's belief state, extending
the sidekick's capabilities.
3.2 Cops and Robbers Revisited
Recall from Section 2.1 that Cops and Robbers is fully observable other than the
state of the human, and also that there is a natural way of characterizing the different
possible goals of the human in the game, namely chasing each of the robbers. This
makes Cops and Robbers an example of the kind of domain that meets the conditions
for the state-space planning approach in this chapter to apply.
The combination of these two properties allow for the formulation of the human
model as solving and executing its part in a joint MDP policy as outlined previously.
Note that if the environment were partially observable from the human's perspective,
this kind of modeling would not be possible, since it would mean solving POMDPs
instead, which is precisely the source of intractability that is motivating this heuristic
approach in the first place.
The asking action in Cops and Robbers is an explicit information seeking action
that allows the sidekick to improve its estimate of the human's intentions directly.
63
It serves as a possibly noisy oracle for revealing the internal state of the human,
but doesn't directly advance the pair towards any of the subgoals. As mentioned
previously, this means that the asking action will never be selected as part of a MDP
policy, however it is often relevant because it can help avoid stepping through a bad
one-way door due to uncertainty about the human's intentions. Because the asking
action is so strongly diagnostic of human intentions, it can sometimes make Cops and
Robbers trivial. When using Cops and Robbers in experiments, we will sometimes
compare performance with and without the asking action to tease out the effect
of communication. In general, the asking action is very advantageous for planning
directly in belief space, whereas for state-space planning with heuristic information
gathering its usefulness is limited by the robustness of the heuristic.
3.3 State Estimation
The sidekick does not have direct access to the state, but it can maintain a belief
state tracking the possible values of hidden state variables, including the human's
intentions, to help it make decisions. This can be achieved by constructing a recursive
Bayes filter from the POMDP dynamics. The filter makes use of the conditional
probability given in Equation 2.15 from Chapter 2,
V o(a, s, z) E,, T(s', a, s)b(s')
z a-(b, a, z)
Starting from an initial belief state, Equation 2.15 gives the rule updating the
sidekick's belief state after taking action a and receiving observation z.
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3.4 MDP Conversion
The strategies for action selection discussed in this chapter all hinge on computing an
optimal state-space policy, 7r*DP, and expected values of each action under that pol-
icy, Q*MDP* This is done by constructing a fully observable MDP, M = (S, A, T,' R),
in which each element is the same as in the POMDP formulation, but there are no ob-
servations or observation function and the states, including the human's intentions,
are fully observable. We then solve for rM*DP using the value iteration algorithm
discussed in Section 2.3.2.3.
3.5 Action Selection
Given the optimal state-space policy, 7rMDP, and the current belief state, b, there
are a number of possible decision rules for selecting an action. We investigated four
approaches that heuristically incorporate a varying degree of information from the
sidekick's belief state and of explicit reasoning about information gathering.
3.5.1 Maximum Likelihood
Maximum likelihood action selection, 7 ML, uses 7rMDP directly to select the action for
the most likely state, according to the belief state. This represents an assumption that
uncertainty about the true state is largely irrelevant, given that we know the most
likely state, and V'ML is a loose lower bound for the POMDP's true value function,
V*. The maximum likelihood policy is given by
7rML(b) = 7rMDP(argmax b(s)).
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3.5.2 QMDP
As a decision rule, 7rML is largely unresponsive to the effect of uncertainty. By con-
trast, QMDP action selection, introduced by Littman et al. [40], weights the Q*MDP
values for the states and actions of the MDP by the state probabilities given by b.
The QMDP weighting represents an optimistic assumption that although the state
may seem ambiguous now, on the time step after selecting the current action, the
world will be completely observable and unambiguous. V'QMDP is a tighter lower
bound for V* than VIML [29]. The QMDP policy is given by
7rQMDP(b) = argmax b(s)Q DP(s, a).
a S
3.5.3 Lookahead
Both rML and rQMDP make the assumption that the state will trivially become com-
pletely observable. This means they will never place any value on pure information
gathering actions and will not take into account any contribution to the true POMDP
value function that comes from an action helping to disambiguate the state. Because
they are both based on VMDP, this is unavoidable. Instead of using fully fledged
belief-space planning, which we will discuss in Chapter 4, we can attempt to mitigate
some of the effects of building approximate controllers using state-space planning by
introducing control systems that reason heuristically about the hidden world state
and can plan to take information gathering actions.
One improvement to the over-optimism of 7rQMDP is to do a limited lookahead
in belief space to assess the value of information gathering actions. We can perform
a simple one-step look-ahead in belief space, and then take an expectation over the
values of the states we may end up in using VkDP, again assuming that from that
point on the state will be disambiguated. This gives us the Q-function
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QLA(b, a) = b(s)r(s, a) + 'y b( a' ~ps)
S 5'
The key term which distinguishes this approach from QMDP is the belief-state
update b . From QLA we can obtain a policy by choosing the action with the best
expected future rewards, given this one-step look ahead,
7FLA(b, a) = argmax QLA(b, a).
a
This approach can be generalized to a k-step lookahead, but the branching factor
of the search is kiAlizi. We will only consider the one-step case in this chapter. In
Chapter 4 we will introduce search methods for belief space that can help cope with
the high branching factor.
3.5.3.1 Action Entropy
The entropy of the sidekick's current belief state is a measure of how uncertain it
currently is about the state. If the sidekick's current belief state has high entropy,
this can be a cue that it ought to try to take information gathering actions to dis-
ambiguate it. However, if the ambiguity in the state would have no bearing on the
actions selected, then it would be inappropriate to gather information. These con-
siderations motivate the action entropy approach, first introduced by Kaelbling et
al. [34]. This approach is a dual-control strategy that heuristically chooses whether
to take information gathering actions or actions suggested by the state-space policies
based on an entropy analysis.
Since a belief state b is a probability distribution, its entropy is H(b) = - >j b(s) log b(s),
where b(s) log b(s) = 0 when b(s) = 0. The expected entropy of the belief state reached
by starting in belief state b and taking some action, a, is then
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EE(a, b) = 1 0(b, a, b')H(b').
Because we care specifically about whether there is ambiguity in which action to
take, rather than switching control based on H(b), we should instead switch on the
entropy of the distribution over optimal actions, according to 7rMDP7
wb(a) = b(s)I(7MDP(S), a),
S
where I is an indicator function.
If the entropy of this distribution is higher than some threshold 4, then we will
select the action that has the best chance of disambiguating the state. Otherwise we
will take the action that maximizes Wb. Thus, the action entropy policy is
argmaxwb(a) if H(wb) < 0,
7WAE(b) - a
argmin EE(a, b) otherwise.
a
One concern with the action entropy approach is that information gathering ac-
tions may not disambiguate the state enough to reduce the belief-state entropy below
the threshold. In this case the agent could become stuck continually trying to gather
information. This could be addressed by heuristically restricting the number of infor-
mation gathering actions that can be taken within some time window, but we have
not explored this possibility.
3.6 Human Modeling Using State-Space Planning
Recall from Section 2.4.1 that a human model H is composed of a set of internal
states 8, observations Z, an observation function 0, an internal update function A,
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and a stochastic policy t. In general, formulating H for the AI assistant problem is a
challenging and potentially ill-defined task, however, if the only partial observability in
the domain stems from uncertainty about the human's internal state, then state-space
planning methods offer a ready solution to this modeling challenge. Specifically, if we
assume that the human expects perfectly optimal collaboration from the sidekick, we
can construct t via value iteration.
3.6.1 Human Types, States, and Observations
In defining our human model we will make use of the notion of types. Types model
sets of beliefs, desires, and intentions that drive behaviors. Our model will assume
that the human is following one of some fixed set of n possible behavior profiles, each
of which is associated with a specific type that represents the human's beliefs, desires,
and intentions. For instance in Cops and Robbers there may be one type for each of
the robbers, representing the human focusing on catching that specific robber. Let
the set of all n such types be E = {01, 02, ... , 0}. We then define 3 to be the set of
state and type pairs 3 = {S x e}. A given human state I = (9, 0) represents the
most recent state experienced by the human and the human's current type.
Recall that 5 is the set of states immediately preceding the human taking an
action. Because the only partial observability in the domain is the human's internal
state, which the human has access to, we can simply specify that Z = S and
1 if 9 = z
6(,, a, 9, z) = . (3.1)
0 otherwise
To construct r we will introduce a set of policies, Uo, called type-policies. A
specific type-policy, r,, E Uo, is the policy that implements the behavior profile
specified by type 60.We will construct type-policies by modeling humans as near-
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optimal MDP solvers. In this section we will outline the general approach to doing
this, motivated throughout by our example domain, Cops and Robbers.
3.6.2 Constructing MDPs for Human Types
Each type-policy will be derived from the solution to an MDP MO that embeds
the human type 0. Constructing the MDP for a type is a heavily domain-dependent
modeling problem, but our example domain can help illuminate the general principles.
We can use an MDP's reward function, 1z, to model human desires. Suppose for
Cops and Robbers that we wanted to model humans as chasing one particular robber
with the expectation that the sidekick would take the optimal move to support them in
catching that robber. We could do this by using a two-agent MDP formulation of Cops
and Robbers with R constructed such that 7Z(s, a, s') = 1 iff both the sidekick and
the human player are standing on the target robber in s'. This two-agent formulation
is trivial to construct, by simply assuming that one monolithic controller can select
the actions of both the human and the sidekick. Solving this MDP for the optimal
joint policy of the human and sidekick gives a decision rule for how the team ought
to act, were they optimally coordinating to catch the robber.
We can also use MDPs to model cases in which the human lacks information about
the environment or misunderstands the dynamics. Consider for instance if we wanted
to model the human chasing a particular robber as before, except that the human
doesn't understand that doors are one-way. We could model this as a two-agent MDP
in the same way as before, but in this case with T(s, a, s') changed so that doors work
in both directions. Solving this MDP for the optimal joint policy again gives the
behavior of a team optimally coordinating to catch a particular robber, were it the
case that they both (falsely) believed that one-way doors were in fact two-way.
Note that the MDP formulation is key, since MDPs, unlike POMDPs, can be
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solved relatively efficiently. This means the state must be fully observable and this
kind of modeling cannot be used to represent a human reasoning optimally about
partially observable domains.
3.6.3 Solving MDPs for Human Types
Given a two-agent MDP, M0 , corresponding to some type, 6, we can use value iter-
ation to find its optimal value function Vt. From this we can derive the human's
half of the joint optimal policy, 7r*, which gives actions that the human should take
were it to be acting optimally with a perfectly coordinating sidekick.
In general we should not expect that humans will follow the optimal policy for an
MDP, and in fact modeling work by Baker et al. [3], in cognitive science has shown
that a better model is that humans select actions with a probability proportional to
their Q-values. With this in mind, instead of constructing 0 directly from 7r*, we
instead construct it via a transformation of Q* .
3.6.4 Constructing Human Policies
There are several reasonable ways to define a probability distribution over actions,
given Q* or .r* The simplest is the c-greedy model, which assumes that the
human will act according to argmax Q*M (, a) with probability 1 - c and select an
action uniformly at random with probability c. However, a potentially more cogni-
tively plausible model, following Baker et al. [3], is to use a Boltzmann distribution,
fr(I = (9, 6), d) oc e-Qmo (§,a)
where 3 is a parameter that controls the amount of noise in the human's actions.
For high values of 3, the human favors actions with higher expected future rewards,
whereas for low values the distribution over actions becomes more uniform.
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3.6.5 Defining the Human State Update Function
The internal state update function A must still be specified. The simplest modeling
choice, though conceptually weak, is to assume that humans are largely indifferent to
changes in the world state and most often continue to maintain their type from state
to state, but with some small probability, c, change to a random type. This gives the
human state update probabilities
1-E if0=9'
6(b = (s, 0), , , b' = (, 9')) = . (3.2){L otherwise
A more sophisticated model might make use of a range of variables in 9 or be
dependent on . For instance, in Cops and Robbers, proximity to a robber or the
actions of the sidekick might play a role.
3.6.6 Communication and Decentralized Beliefs
The modeling approach we have just described makes the strong assumption that
humans act as if they shared a common belief about the internal state with their
sidekick collaborators. An important consequence of this is that the policies derived
through state-space planning in this way will not take into account the true decen-
tralized nature of beliefs in the human's interaction with the sidekick. To see why,
imagine that the human player had an action available that revealed the values of its
internal state variables to the sidekick. From the state-space planning perspective,
sending such a message is a wasted action, since the world is completely observable,
and beliefs are centralized, so the team stands to gain nothing from the human taking
it. As a result, communication cannot be handled through state-space planning and
requires a separate system. This is true in general of reasoning about how human
and sidekick actions will affect one another's beliefs. It is something that state-space
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planning cannot account for, and to do so optimally would require a more expressive
formalism, such as Dec-POMDPs.
For Cops and Robbers, which includes communication actions, we opted for a
domain-specific heuristic approach to communication and modeled the human as al-
ways responding truthfully to requests for information about its internal state, with
some noise. Other modeling options include the action entropy and belief-space looka-
head approaches discussed previously.
3.7 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we discuss the domains, controller and model parameters, and ex-
perimental setup used for evaluating the action selection methods described in this
chapter. We conclude with experimental results and discussion.
3.7.1 Domains
We compared the different approaches to action selection presented in Section 3.5 on
two video game domains, Cops and Robbers, described in Section 2.1, and Collabo-
rative Ghostbuster, first introduced with the CAPIR framework [45].
In testing on Cops and Robbers we used five maps, shown in Figure 3-2. Each
map is constructed such that the human's first sequence of actions is ambiguous with
respect to the robber they're chasing. This means that the sidekick must decide what
to do in the face of uncertainty about the human's goal, which is intended to draw out
the differences between the action selection methods, in particular favoring actions
that can help disambiguate the human's intentions.
C&R1 is a basic map containing no doors, which lets the sidekick easily recover
from having misjudged the human's goal. In C&R2 stepping though the door to the
blue robber traps the cop in the northwest part of the map and chasing the yellow
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(a) C&R1 (b) C&R2
(c) C&R3 (d) C&R4
(e) C&R5
Figure 3-2: The maps used for Cops and Robbers. The human is shown holding a
gun, whereas the sidekick holds a doughnut and truncheon. Doors only open in the
direction of the chevrons.
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robber commits a cop to moving through the whole loop in the south. In C&R3
without any communication the human's intentions will be ambiguous for at least six
steps, but because the robbers are initially close to each other, the sidekick can herd
them together to hedge their bets about the human's target. The two robbers in the
west of C&R4 make it attractive to enter that room, but if the human is chasing the
yellow robber, changing course is costly. C&R5 is symmetric, with the choice to step
through the west or east doors initially committing the sidekick to chasing the red or
blue robber respectively.
Collaborative Ghostbuster is a game with asymmetric roles for the sidekick and
human. As with Cops and Robbers, the human, represented as a shepherd, and the
sidekick, represented as a dog, are pursuing enemies through a maze. The enemies
are ghosts who flee from the players within 4 cells of them. The goal for the human
is to eliminate all the ghosts. They can do so via an action which emits a short
ranged zap that destroys any ghost within 4 cells in each orthogonal direction. The
sidekick, on the other hand, cannot destroy ghosts, and must instead help by herding
them towards the human to be zapped. Our implementation of Ghostbusters differed
slightly from the one reported in the CAPIR paper in that ghosts stayed still, rather
than performing a random walk, when neither the human nor the sidekick were near.
Figure 3-3 shows the maps used for evaluation on Collaborative Ghostbuster, both
of which were introduced along with CAPIR [45]. In GB1 the ghost near the human
can be zapped immediately, leaving only two ghosts remaining, which are relatively
easy for the sidekick to round up for the human to zap. In GB2 the sidekick must
reach the northern part of the map to drive the ghosts back south and west towards
the human and the human's initial moves may be ambiguous as to the ghost they are
chasing.
We chose to model both Cops and Robbers and Collaborative Ghostbuster as
infinite horizon problems with an absorbing zero-reward state that the game enters
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(a) GB1 (b) GB2
Figure 3-3: The maps used for Collaborative Ghostbusters. The human is shown as
a shepherd and the sidekick as a dog.
when it terminates. Infinite-horizon MDPs have the advantage of only requiring us to
solve for a single stationary policy. Were we to model these domains as finite-horizon
MDPs, we would instead have to solve for multiple time-indexed, non-stationary
policies, one for each time step.
For both Cops and Robbers and Collaborative Ghostbuster we solved for policies
of abstracted versions of the problem by ignoring the non-target robbers and ghosts
respectively. This abstraction works in the case of Cops and Robbers because the
robbers have no influence on each others' behavior and have no impact on the outcome
of the human or sidekick behaviors. In Collaborative Ghostbuster however this is not
a lossless abstraction, since the game doesn't end after the first ghost is shot. In
fact, strategically herding several ghosts to all be shot at once may be the optimal
strategy. On the other hand, this abstraction dramatically reduces the space cost of
value iteration and was previously used in the CAPIR framework.
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3.7.2 Controller and Human Model Parameters
Each of the four action-selection methods used a human model constructed using value
iteration on the multi-agent formulation of the domain as described in Section 3.6,
with E = 0.001 for value iteration convergence. The noise parameter, 0, was 0.1,
which for these domains typically represented a 60% chance of selecting the highest
Q-valued action when Q-values were very close, but strongly favored the on-policy
action there was one clear winner according to Q-values. For belief-state updates,
the Bayes filter made the assumption that the human would maintain its type with
probability 0.9 and select a new type uniformly at random otherwise.
To compute QMDP for the sidekick, value iteration was performed on the single-
agent MDP incorporating the human model with the convergence threshold 6 = 0.001.
In contrast to belief-state updates, this computation assumed that humans would not
change targets. This was in line with the strategy of estimating the human's current
goal and selecting actions to support it, without hedging against the possibility of
the human changing goals in the future and in doing so follows the approach of the
CAPIR framework.
For the action-entropy controller, the entropy threshold <$ was 0.6, which was se-
lected empirically for the best performance on all maps out of values ranging between
0 and 1.
3.7.3 Simulated Humans
We evaluated each action-selection method with a simulated human partner. Our
simulated human represents an ego-centric greedy strategy from a below-average hu-
man player that doesn't consider how the sidekick is likely to respond to their actions,
assuming that the sidekick will play around its poor choices. This contrasts with the
expectation encoded in the sidekick's human model that the human is actively think-
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ing about coordination with the sidekick. We took this as representative of play
strategies that are actively attempting to win the game, but are not particularly ef-
fective, so that results produced using the simulated human are hopefully indicative
of the performance of the controller when paired with a sub-optimal human player.
For Cops and Robbers, the simulated human selected a robber uniformly at ran-
dom and myopically chased after that target, taking the shortest path to it, computed
using A*. Once adjacent to its target it would wait until the sidekick was also ad-
jacent before stepping into the robber's square to avoid letting the robber escape.
With 0.1 chance it would instead select an action uniformly at random. Simulated
humans never changed targets, even if that target became unreachable. If the simu-
lated human was asked for its target by the sidekick it would respond with its true
target with probability 0.9 and otherwise choose a response uniformly at random.
The simulated human for Collaborative Ghostbuster similarly selected a ghost
uniformly at random and chased it myopically after it using A*. If it ever came
within range of any ghost it would activate its zapping pulse. Like in Cops and
Robbers, with 0.1 chance it would instead select an action uniformly at random. At
each time step, with a probability of 0.1, it reselected a ghost to chase uniformly at
random from the ghosts not yet zapped.
3.7.4 Trials
For both Cops and Robbers and Collaborative Ghostbuster we ran 1000 trials for each
controller on each map. We used a turn limit of 100 for Cops and Robbers and 200 for
Collaborative Ghostbuster. We measured the number of steps required to complete
the game, either by catching a robber in Cops and Robbers or by eliminating all the
ghosts in Collaborative Ghostbuster. Our tests were run on a system with a quad-
core 2.3GHz Intel i7 processor and 8GB of RAM. In each case, the wall clock time
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required for action selection was less than 20 milliseconds.
3.7.5 Results and Discussion
The results of our experimental trials differed distinctly across the two domains. We
present and discuss each of them in turn.
3.7.5.1 Cops and Robbers
For each of the maps and action-selection methods we present the mean number of
steps taken to catch a robber, both in aggregate across all targets and broken down
by the particular target that the simulated human was chasing. This break down is
particularly revealing of the kinds of errors that the controllers can make. Since the
simulated humans never changed targets, they would never compromise by re-picking
a robber that was easier to catch, given the sidekick's actions. In the worst case, the
game could reach an unwinnable state if the sidekick trapped itself, since the myopic
play of the simulated human would not help it recover.
Controller scores for C&R1
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Figure 3-4: Mean steps taken to catch a robber in C&R1.
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Figure 3-4 shows the results for C&R1. In this chart and throughout this section
grey bars show the mean number of steps taken by each controller, averaged over
1000 trials. The colored bars show the mean number of steps taken, broken down by
robber, so for instance the blue bar shows results specifically for the cases where the
simulated human was chasing the blue robber. Error bars show the standard error of
the sample mean.
The results for C&R1 demonstrate that when actions are easily reversible, the per-
formance of each of the controllers is roughly comparable, with MLMDP performing
slightly worse due to committing to actions moving east and south before having seen
a disambiguating action from the human. This comes from the fact that MLMDP will
always take an on-policy action for collaboratively chasing either of the two robbers.
Action entropy prompted the player for their target an average of just over once per
trial, and was still tied for the best performer despite having spent two steps to ask
and hear the reply. One-step lookahead, by contrast, asked 0.3 times per trial.
As shown in Figure 3-5, on C&R2 the controllers all perform poorly for the yellow
robber. This happens for the same reason in each case, which is that their model does
not accurately predict the human's myopic behavior. Once it becomes clear that the
human is moving south from the center of the map, the sidekick heads east through
the door in the bottom corridor, expecting the human to head west, according to
the joint policy for catching that robber. The simulated human, however, follows
the sidekick through the door, resulting in the two having to chase the yellow robber
around the map and try to pin it in a dead end. Even if the sidekick correctly identifies
the human's target, this thwarts them.
The high mean and variance for MLMDP and action entropy chasing red stem
from the sidekick misinterpreting noise in the player's actions as a commitment to
chasing one of the other two robbers, causing the sidekick to step through either the
eastern or western doors. In particular, a noisy pass action or bumping into a wall is
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seen as a cue that the human is chasing yellow because it indicates that the human is
waiting for the sidekick to drive yellow to the north. The resulting belief-state update
typically causes action entropy to prompt for the human's goal, even when the true
goal will soon be revealed through the simulated human's actions, which causes the
chase to take longer than for MLMDP. By contrast, QMDP tends to early, which
is typically the action that compromises between the different possible robbers, and
avoids these problems.
The belief-space lookahead controller suffers a systematic failure when chasing the
blue robber. It reaches the western door, at which point its one step of belief-space
lookahead reveals that moving west is terrible if the goal is to chase either of the
other targets, but that asking whether the human truly is chasing the blue robber
will help let it know whether it really is worth stepping west. However, the belief-
state update upon receiving an answer from the human will never result in it being
certain enough to finally decide to step through, and one step of belief-space search
is not deep enough to detect this, leading to the sidekick being stuck in a question
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Figure 3-5: Mean steps taken to catch a robber in C&R2.
81
a,
-
0.
asking loop.
(U
70
60
50
40
30
20
101
Controller scores for C&R3
I Overall U Red U Blue Yellow
ICR :iftl
MLMDP QMDP ActionEntropy Lookahead
Controller
Figure 3-6: Mean steps taken to catch a robber in C&R3.
The results for C&R3 in Figure 3-6 show that MLMDP, QMDP, and one-step
lookahead all perform similarly however action entropy's performance in chasing red
gives it an edge. Action entropy always opens by asking the human for their target
as its first action on this map, which allows it to set up red for an earlier capture
when the human indicates that red is its target.
Figure 3-7 shows the results for C&R4. In each case the myopic simulated human
frequently sabotages attempts at coordination, resulting in high variance scores as
the sidekick attempts to make up for the human's missteps. MLMDP's early actions
are contingent on tie breaking, leading to stepping through the north door two thirds
of the time and the east door the rest of the time, before the human has revealed
their intent through their actions, which leads to the higher variance in its scores.
Both action entropy and one-step lookahead consistently ask the human for their
target before leaving their starting area, actively chasing the human's target. QMDP
on the other hand waits until the human reveals its target by moving west to the room
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Figure 3-7: Mean steps taken to catch a robber in C&R4.
with red and blue or heading east to yellow. The particular interaction between the
myopic actions of the human and the fact that the QMDP controller enters the room
containing the target robber later than the other two controllers gives the QMDP
controller an edge overall, particularly in the case of chasing red.
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Figure 3-8: Mean steps taken to catch a robber in C&R5.
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Figure 3-8 shows the results for C&R5. MLMDP's tie breaking causes it to arbi-
trarily pick one robber, and step through the door to chase it. If it happens to pick
the same one as the human model, this works well, but if not it leads to a long chase.
Action entropy consistently asks for the human's target on its first turn and chases it,
leading to an optimal path almost every time. By contrast, QMDP waits to see what
the human does, which leads to the simulated human moving up the central corridor,
as opposed to going through a side corridor, which it does if the sidekick acts sooner
to drive its target closer to it, leading to a circuitous chase.
Single-move belief-space lookahead has two failure modes. One is similar to the
QMDP case, where not acting immediately causes the human to move up the central
corridor. The other occurs when noise causes the simulated human to move west
from its starting location. This triggers a particularly bad chain of reasoning, where
the sidekick would like to step through the western door and drive the red ghost to
the human. However, one step of lookahead reveals that the human is likely to move
back into the central corridor, which from the sidekick's perspective is a lower value
state than the current one. To prevent this move, the sidekick asks the human for
its target, forcing it to respond and leading to a repeat of the same state. Similar
to the case with C&R2, the single step of lookahead, and the ad hoc integration of
question asking into the policy, means that the search will not reveal that change to
the belief state will not be enough to prevent the same circle of reasoning on the next
step, which leads to an infinite loop of question asking.
3.7.5.2 Collaborative Ghostbuster
The results for both GB1 and GB2 are presented in Figures 3-9 and 3-10. In contrast
to Cops and Robbers there is no breakdown by target, since the goal is to zap all
ghosts. All four controllers perform similarly. This stems from the fact that actions
in Collaborative Ghostbuster are largely reversible and do not commit the sidekick
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Figure 3-9: Mean steps taken by each controller in GB1.
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Figure 3-10: Mean steps taken by each controller in GB2.
to a particular course of action, unlike the case of Cops and Robbers, where doors
make recovering from errors challenging. These characteristics are shared with C&R1,
which showed similar results. Additionally, the absence of communication actions in
Collaborative Ghostbuster removes the advantage that the action entropy and one-
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step lookahead controllers have through using those actions.
3.8 Conclusions
As mentioned in the previous section, in cases characterized by the ability to easily
recover from being mistaken about the human's target, such as C&R1 and both
Collaborative Ghostbuster maps, action entropy and belief-space lookahead gave little
benefit if any over the methods that did not actively reason about the effect of the
sidekick's actions on their beliefs. For C&R 2-5 the results were mixed. Both action
entropy and belief-space lookahead were able to incorporate information gathering,
and communication in particular, into their action repertoire, but this only made
a notable improvement for action entropy over QMDP and maximum likelihood on
C&R 3 and 5.
For one-step lookahead, the communication action in some cases was an active
hinderance, since its one step of lookahead was not enough to detect that, in asking
for the sidekick's target, it could find itself in a belief state that would cause it to
repeat itself. This is an effect of the value function that one-step lookahead uses to
assess actions not taking into account the fact that the sidekick will be performing
lookahead again to select actions in the future. We used one step of lookahead here,
but in general, belief-space lookahead would not be able to detect a potential action
loop outside of its search horizon.
The domains in this chapter represent the practical limit of the size of the state
space that our value-iteration implementation was able to handle, with the largest
map, GB2, containing 565 states, reduced to 563 since in our abstraction we only
reasoned about the position of the human, sidekick, and target ghost. In general, the
memory required for solving an MDP with value iteration scales with the size of the
state space, which grows exponentially with the number of state variables, unless a
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compact representation of the value function can be found. Commercial video games
have very large state spaces, so ideally we would like to avoid representing the entire
value function if it is not required.
This scalability concern, along with the shortcomings of limited lookahead in belief
space, motivate our approach in the next chapter. Rather than attempting to solve
the fully observable MDP and use its value function for action selection, we will use
POMCP to search directly in the action-observation tree. By using estimates from
Monte Carlo simulations we will avoid having to represent the entire value function.
Additionally POMCP's sample-based search allows it to manage the branching factor
of the search space and search all the way to the planning horizon, thereby avoiding
the kinds of looping problems we found with belief-space lookahead.
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Chapter 4
Belief-space Planning for Sidekicks
4.1 Introduction
The controllers based on state-space planning for building sidekick controllers from
Chapter 3 suffered from key weaknesses that we address in this chapter.
Each state-space planning approach, as well as our human model, made use of
value iteration on an MDP formulation of the Al sidekick POMDP or the game
dynamics. Value iteration, however, has the drawback that in the worst case it must
explicitly represent V*(s) for each s in S, and ISI is exponential in the number of
state variables. Some domains allow for V* to be factored so as avoid this, but it
is true in the general case. For commercial video games domains, even those with
modest scopes, the number of state variables will often be too large for an approach
using value iteration to be practical.
In addition to the problems of using value iteration, our decision-theoretic human
model required that, other than its own internal state, the rest of the domain be fully
observable. Ideally we would like to be able to build sidekick controllers for domains
with a larger amount of partial observability.
Although the belief-space lookahead and action entropy controllers did incorporate
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information gathering and communication actions into the sidekick's repertoire, they
did so in an ad hoc way. For lookahead, the result was that the sidekick failed
to reason correctly about what its future strategy would be, because its lookahead
assumed that it would be selecting actions according to its state-space policy, when
in fact it would be selecting actions on the basis of its lookahead. In some cases
this caused behavioral loops. Action entropy, on the other hand, performed better
on our test domains, but both parts of its dual control strategy were ad hoc. It
selected actions suggested by policies that assumed that all actions subsequent to
the one being chosen would be on-policy, when this was not in fact the case. The
same applies to the QMDP and maximum likelihood controllers, with the additional
downside that they could not incorporate information gathering and communication.
To address these problems we turn to the Partially Observable Monte Carlo Plan-
ning (POMCP) algorithm as a combined action selection and state estimation method
for building a sidekick controller [57].
POMCP plans by searching directly in the space of action-observation histories,
which we will refer to, slightly inaccurately, as belief-space planning. Strictly speak-
ing, belief-space planning implies that we are planning in space of belief states, how-
ever it will be more practical for us to use histories. If necessary a history can be
converted to a belief state using Bayes' rule. Working directly in belief space, or with
histories, alleviates the need for ad-hoc integration of communication and information
gathering actions, because the search will inherently take into account the effect of
the sidekick's actions on their belief state.
There are trade-offs to searching in the tree of action-observation histories versus
searching in the tree of beliefs. The primary advantage of using action-observations
histories is that it, as we shall discuss later in detail, it allows us to use a black-box
generative model of the dynamics of the domain to do the search using sampling,
rather than requiring that we have an explicit model of the domain. It also alleviates
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the need to do a possibly costly belief update at each step of the search. The key
disadvantage however is that when two different histories map to the same belief, we
will not take advantage of this fact to save on time and space as we would if we were
to use the belief tree.
One worry about the move to belief space may be that the scalability issues
experienced in value iteration may be exacerbated. However, POMCP also has the
property that it focuses its planning efforts in the region of belief space reachable from
the agent's current belief and that is most likely to be reachable via the algorithm's
estimate of 7r*. This avoids needing to represent a large part of its estimates for V*
or 7r*, which helps address the scalability concerns.
Planning in belief space means we must contend with the PSPACE-Completeness
of POMDPs and will need to be content with only approximating the optimal POMDP
policy. POMCP is an approximate, anytime algorithm, meaning that, if parameter-
ized correctly, it continually improves its estimate of r* as it runs, converging to the
true optimal policy in the limit, but it can be stopped at any time to give an approxi-
mation to ir* [57]. The asymptotic convergence rate is domain independent, but may
be slower than is feasible for games domains, which often require fast decisions from
a sidekick.
Building human models for partially observable domains is a challenging problem,
since modeling them as decision-theoretic planners as we did in the previous chapter
is intractable given partial observability. We would still like to demonstrate POMCP
as a solution method for the Al sidekick problem in these domains however, so we
fall back on heuristic human models.
Our contribution in this chapter is to demonstrate how POMCP can be applied to
the Al sidekick problem and to introduce an ensemble-based parallelization strategy
for improving the performance of POMCP. We demonstrate these techniques on a
variety of games domains, using heuristic human models.
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4.2 POMCP
POMCP is comprised of two steps. A search step called Partially Observable UCT
(PO-UCT), and a belief update step that uses particle filtering to approximate an
exact belief-state update. The key idea behind PO-UCT is to sample states from
the current belief state, and use each of these samples as a starting point to generate
a history, by selecting actions and generating observations from a simulator that
implements the dynamics of the POMDP until a terminal state or effective horizon is
reached. The action selection that constitutes the search is guided partly by statistics
gathered from previous simulations, and partly by random action selection.
After a set timeout or number of histories have been generated, POMCP stops
sampling and takes the action with the highest expected value at the root of the
tree, according to its current estimate from the simulations it has produced. After
taking the action and receiving an observation from its true environment, it updates
its belief state via particle filtering and begins its search step again.
In the next sections we discuss some of the core elements of POMCP, noting any
special requirements for the Al sidekick problem, and then present the algorithm
itself.
4.2.1 Simulator
The use of a simulator, 9, that implements the transition, observation, and reward
dynamics of a POMDP distinguishes POMCP from approaches that use explicit prob-
abilistic models such as value iteration. One step of simulation, (s', z, p) - 9(s, a),
takes the state s and action a as input and outputs a tuple of successor state s', ob-
servation z, and reward p sampled from the dynamics of the POMDP. By repeatedly
using successor states and new actions as inputs to the simulator an action-observation
history can be produced by concatenating the sequence of input actions and output
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observations.
Two basic approaches to creating a simulator for a video game domain are to
use the game engine for simulation and to construct a simulator from an explicit
probabilistic model of the game's dynamics.
The engine approach requires the game engine to be built such that it can be set to
an arbitrary state and can produce successor states upon demand, given actions, and
provide information about what the player and sidekick can observe in the resulting
state. These requirements are not trivial, since in many engines, resetting the game
state may be costly, and that cost must be paid for each trajectory.
The explicit model approach avoids dealing with the engine at the cost of a greater
modeling effort. In this approach the game must be expressed in an explicit POMDP
formulation. For many current video games this is non-trivial and, as with the case
of the engine approach, may involve discretizing continuous elements of the game.
Given such a formulation however, it is straightforward to implement a simulator.
Given a state and action, the transition, observation, and reward functions can be
sampled to give the outputs that POMCP requires.
There are challenges involved in both of these approaches that are general for any
POMDP formulation of the problem. For real-time games with continuous action
spaces, the notion of a time step or even a discrete set of actions may be unclear. In
these cases either the game must be designed to work around this or POMCP must
interact with the engine through an interface that provides this layer of abstraction or
in the explicit model approach the model must make this abstraction. Additionally,
many games have no concept of reward in the decision-theoretic sense, in which case
the reward signal would need to be generated by some other process or specified in
the explicit model.
For the Al sidekick problem the simulator must also allow for a human model
to select actions. With an explicit model this requires formulating the POMDP to
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include the human model as outlined in Chapter 2. Using a game engine would
typically require building a wrapper around the engine to convert a two-player game
into a single-player game. The process for doing this is game engine specific, but
in short the simulator must implement Th and T as generative processes. Sampling
Th given a state and sidekick action gives the intermediate state immediately after
the sidekick's action but before the human's. The human's state update and action
selection are then sampled from the human model H and used as input for sampling
from Th, which gives the resulting state and observation for the sidekick. The game
engine may also be used for 0 in H. The wrapper also needs to ensure the correct
properties of the state, in particular that the human's last action is embedded in the
state in order for the Th to extract it correctly in the next step. It is also responsible
for sampling R, which again may need to be specified externally to the game engine.
4.2.2 Belief Function
POMCP searches in the space H of action-observation histories and we will often
want to know what belief state corresponds to one of these histories. The belief
function B (s, h) = Pr(sIh), performs this conversion. Given an initial belief I, using
Equation 2.13 from Section 2.4 allows us to write
B(s', haz) = ES 1(s, h)T(s, a, s')o(s', a, z)
SEs Est/ EB(s, h)r(s, a, s")o(s", a, z))
where haz is a sequence of actions and observations that ends in the action a and
observation z.
Although in principle B could be computed using Equation 4.1, POMCP makes the
assumption that the POMDP dynamics are unavailable, and instead uses a particle
filter to compute B(s, h) during its belief-state update step. For convenience we will
often write the belief state b using this notation as B(., h).
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4.2.3 Search Tree and Returns
POMCP uses a tree data structure T that contains a set of nodes storing statistics
about histories. The node T(h) stores a tuple (N(h), V(h), B(., h)) of the number of
times that the history h has been visited, a running estimate of the value of h, and a
set of particles representing the belief state for h.
A return, Rt, is the total discounted reward accumulated in a simulation from
time t onwards, with V(h), being an estimate of the expected return of the optimal
policy, starting from the belief state B(., h).
4.2.4 PO-UCT Search
Algorithm 4.1 shows the PO-UCT step of POMCP, which performs UCT search on
the tree of histories rooted at the sidekick's current history [36]. It generates these
histories via Monte-Carlo simulation using the simulator and two different action
selection policies. Which policy is used depends on the stage of the search. The
stages are Simulate and Rollout.
Each round of Simulate begins by sampling a state from B(., h). During Simulate,
actions are selected according to the UCB1 rule, which chooses actions in one of two
ways. If there are one or more actions, a, for which N(h, a) = 0, then UCB1 picks one
of them uniformly at random, and takes that action. If each action has been selected
at least once in h, then the UCB1 selects argmaxV(ha) + c /log N(h)/N(ha), where
a
c is a constant that controls the ratio of exploration to exploitation in the search. If
c is chosen appropriately, then PO-UCT's estimate of V* will converge to the true
value in the limit. After selecting each action, Simulate uses the simulator to generate
an observation, successor state, and reward, appending the action and observation to
the search's history. The Rollout phase begins when the search reaches a history that
has no node in T.
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During Rollout, actions are selected according to a stochastic rollout policy, typ-
ically uniformly at random, although convergence can be faster if a more informed
policy is used. In order to preserve PO-UCT's convergence guarantees, the rollout
policy must have a non-zero probability of choosing each available action for a given
history. Rollout ends when a terminal state is reached or the planning horizon dmax
is reached. For infinite horizon problems the effective horizon dmax = 1/(1 - -y) can
be used.
Once Rollout completes, statistics on the rewards accumulated and history visita-
tion counts throughout the simulation are recorded in T. Additionally T is extended
to include the node for the history at which the Rollout phase first began. The
Rollout phase then ends and a new Simulation phase begins with a new state being
sampled. This continues until a maximum number of simulated histories k is reached.
Alternatively simulations can be continued until a timeout is reached.
4.2.5 Belief Update
POMCP uses particle-filter-like rejection sampling to approximate B(-, h). The filter
is initialized by sampling a set of particles, IC, from the initial belief. After performing
an action a in the real game, and receiving the real observation z, POMCP performs
its belief update step using rejection sampling to generate |KI new particles. In
practice, it is possible to reuse some of the state samples generated during the tree-
search step to reduce the number of particles that must be generated during the belief
update step. Particle reinvigoration techniques, such as introducing artificial noise
into the current set of particles, can also be introduced to avoid particle deprivation.
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Algorithm 4.1 Partially Observable UCT (PO-UCT)
1: procedure SEARCH(h)
2: for i = 1 -+ k do
3: if h = 0 then
4: S ~ I
5: else
6: s B h)
7: end if
8: SIMULATE(s, h, 0)
9: end for
10: return argmaxV(ha)
a
11: end procedure
12: procedure SIMULATE(s, h, d)
13: if d > dmax then
14: return 0
15: end if
16: if h T then
17: for allaE Ado
18: T(ha) <- (Ni,,it(ha), Vinit(ha),1 0)
19: end for
20: return ROLLOUT(S, h, d)
21: end if
22: a = argmax V(hh) + cV/log N(h)/N(hh)
a
23: (s', I, p) ~g(s, a)
24: R <- p + 'y.SIMULATE(s', haz, d + 1)
25: B(-, h) <- B(-, h) U {s}
26: N(h) <- N(h) + 1
27: N(ha) <- N(ha) + 1
28: V(ha) - V(ha) + (R - V(ha))/N(ha)
29: return R
30: end procedure
31: procedure ROLLOUT(s, h, d)
32: if d> dmax then
33: return 0
34: end if
35: a ' 7ronout(h,-)
36: (s', z, p) - 9(s, a)
37: return p + -. ROLLOUT(s', haz, d + 1)
38: end procedure
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4.3 Human Models
Since we wish to generalize our planning to problems beyond the restricted set that we
considered in Chapter 3 in which only the internal state of the human was hidden, the
modeling approach presented in the Section 3.6 is not applicable. The generalization
of the joint MDP solving method to partially observable domains is solving a Dec-
POMDP, which is intractable. Instead we will be forced to rely on domain-specific
heuristic human models that we will introduce in Section 4.5.3.
4.4 Parallelization
Search parallelization in UCT has been shown to improve performance in two ways
across a range of MDP domains, which motivates our parallelization approach for the
POMDP case [21].
The first kind of improvement is parallel time advantage, in which combining the
results of multiple searches with k simulations performed across n cores produces
higher quality actions than a single search done with k on one core. The existence of
parallel time advantage implies that adding extra cores can improve action quality,
keeping the time cost fixed.
The second kind of improvement is single-core time advantage, in which combining
the results of multiple searches with k simulations performed across n cores produces
actions with at least as high quality as a single search done with n . k simulations on
one core. The implication of single-core time advantage is that it is possible to reduce
the time cost of producing actions by running multiple short searches in parallel,
rather than a single long search.
A naive approach to parallelizing PO-UCT might be to split the work of perform-
ing the Simulate and Rollout phases across cores. However, since PO-UCT requires
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both read and write access to T in order to select actions and update return statistics,
synchronizing these operations on a common data structure is a challenge. We side-
stepped this problem and developed ensemble PO-UCT, based on ensemble UCT [21],
in which threads operate solely on local data, only requiring one point of synchro-
nization at the end of the search.
Ensemble UCT is a parallelization approach that is parameterized by an ensemble
size, n, a number of simulated histories, k, and the UCT exploration constant, c. It
uses a root parallelization strategy that splits the work into n separate UCT searches,
distributing them across n cores, generating k state-action histories in each search,
and then combining the statistics at the roots of each of the search trees once they are
all complete. With a small modification, this strategy can be applied to PO-UCT.
Ensemble PO-UCT uses the same parallelization strategy as Ensemble UCT, with
two exceptions. First, B is passed as an additional parameter to each core, so that ini-
tial states can be sampled, and second, the search is over action-observation histories
rather than state-action histories.
Let V(ha) and N(ha) be respectively the value function estimate and visit counts
at depth 1 of T on i-th core after PO-UCT is complete. The root parallelization value
function estimate is then
n" V'(ha) -N'(ha)
VRp(ha) = E= .(ha) (4.2)
Additionally, the particles generated during PO-UCT at depth 2 in each tree can
be combined for the belief update step can be combined. Let lB(., haz) be the set of
particles stored in node T(haz) on i-th core after PO-UCT is complete. The combined
particle set is then simply
B(., haz) = B'(haz). (4.3)
i=1
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The rationale behind these ensemble methods is that performing n searches with k
simulated histories in parallel and combining the root statistics is likely to outperform
a single search with k simulated histories, since averaging across the independent
approximations of V*(ha) at the root reduces the variance from the Monte Carlo
simulations. Clearly, however, this reduction in variance comes at the cost in memory
of performing n independent searches in parallel.
Empirically, both parallel time advantage and single-core time advantage have
been demonstrated across a range of fully observable domains, including Backgammon
and Yahtzee. These results were contingent on n - k being sufficiently large [21]. We
will present evidence for both kinds of advantage for the Cops and Robbers domain
in Section 4.5.6.5.
4.5 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we discuss the domains, planner and model parameters, and experi-
mental setup used for evaluating the methods described in this chapter. We conclude
with experimental results and discussion.
4.5.1 Domains
We used three domains in our evaluation: Cops and Robbers, Collaborative Ghost-
buster, and Hidden Gold.
Cops and Robbers is described in Chapter 3. We used the same maps to give
a point of comparison. To test the scalability of the POMCP approach we also
introduced two larger maps, Li and L2, shown in Figure 4-1, that were intractable
for our value iteration implementation. Li has 1105 states, with the shortest possible
action sequence to catch the furthest robber, yellow, being 44 steps. L2 has 3395
states, with the shortest possible action sequence to catch the furthest robber, blue,
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being 72 steps. Although our state-space planner only tried to solve for the optimal
plan for catching a single robber, which requires considering 110' and 3393 state
projections of Li and L2's state-spaces respectively, this was still beyond the memory
limits of our value iteration implementation and hardware.
Collaborative Ghostbuster and the maps used were described in Section 3.7.1.
Hidden Gold is a collaborative search game in which the human and the sidekick
are pirates searching for buried treasure. The pirates have an unreliable map with
multiple Xs marked on it, indicating the possible location of the treasure. Any pirate
walking next to, or on top of the treasure receives a glitter observation in its direction.
The pirates are always visible to each other. Digging up the treasure and winning
the game requires both players to stand on top of it, which gives a reward of 1. All
other state-action combinations give 0 reward. Pirates are able to move in any of the
cardinal directions, pass, and shout "Yarr!" to one another to indicate that they've
found something or simply fool around. As with the other domains, the intentions of
the human are a hidden part of the state from the sidekick's perspective. However,
unlike the others, there is partial observability in the general environment too. To
do well, the sidekick must reason about what their own observations reveal about the
location of the treasure, as well as what observations the human has likely received,
and where the human is planning to search, so that the sidekick can plan its own
efficient search path.
We tested our POMCP controller on four Hidden Gold maps, shown in Figure 4-2.
HG1 is a simple symmetrical map, with Xs in two corners. HG2 has two regions in
the north, one containing two Xs close to each other and the other containing only
one. In HG3 it is possible to check the X in the east on the way to the X in the
southeast. HG4 is similar in structure to HG2, in that there are two Xs in a region
of the map that are relatively close to each other and one farther away, but it takes
more of a commitment to check both of the close Xs than in HG2.
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(a) Li
(b) L2
Figure 4-1: The maps used for Cops and Robbers scalability tests. The human is
shown holding a gun, whereas the sidekick holds a doughnut and truncheon. Doors
only open in the direction of the chevrons.
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(a) HG1 (b) HG2
(c) HG3 (d) HG4
Figure 4-2: The maps used for Hidden Gold. The human has blue hair and the
sidekick has red hair.
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4.5.2 Planner Parameters
For Cops and Robbers, POMCP's UCB1 parameter c was 1, chosen empirically, and
7 was 0.99. We used the particles generated from forward search for the belief update,
as described in section 4.2.5.For C&R1 through 5 we terminated simulated histories
after 100 steps. For our rollout policy we biased action selection towards minimizing
the Manhattan distance to the sampled human model's target, such that these actions
were twice as likely to be selected. We used 50,000 simulated histories per action for
C&R1 through 5. We discuss the settings used for Li and L2 in section 4.5.6.4.
For Collaborative Ghostbuster we used the same POMCP settings as for Cops
and Robbers, but with c = 3, again chosen empirically, and terminating simulated
histories after 200 steps.
For Hidden Gold we again used the same settings, but with c = 1 and uniform
random action selection as the default policy during the Rollout phase.
Since no state-space planning based controller could be built for Hidden Gold, we
also built a heuristic planner as a point of comparison. The planner behaved in the
same way as the Hidden Gold human model, which we will describe in the following
section, but unlike that model it kept track of which Xs had been investigated by
both players. When selecting a new target after having found no gold at the X it was
investigating, it would only choose from among the Xs that hadn't been visited be
either player. It did not have the random target switching behavior of the model.
We did not use particle reinvigoration except in the case of complete particle
deprivation, where we attempted to recover by sampling another 1000 particles via
rejection sampling in the same manner as for the belief update. This happened in
less than 5 cases over all trials.
Throughout the results section we show the results of the QMDP planner using
the settings presented in Chapter 3 as a point of comparison.
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4.5.3 Human Models
For Cops and Robbers, we tested POMCP with two different human models. The first
was a decision-theoretic model constructed via state-space planning as in Chapter 3.
It used the same configuration and parameters as described in Section 3.7.2 with
one exception. In the previous previous chapter the internal state-update function
A assumed no type switching for value iteration tractability reasons, and then type
switching was later accounted for in the belief update. For the model used in POMCP
however, A switched types each step with probability 0.1 as described in Section 3.6.5.
This means that POMCP's value function estimates assumed that the human may
switch type in the course of pursuing a robber.
Since Li and L2 were intractractable for our value iteration implementation we
were forced to implement a heuristic human model. As we have argued in the case
of the simulated human, a reasonable expectation of human behavior in Cops and
Robbers is for them to have some target robber in mind and to simply move by the
shortest path towards their target, relying on the sidekick to react to their actions
appropriately. We implemented such a model by replacing our decision-theoretic
models action selection criteria for constructing t with the policy used by the sim-
ulated human in Chapter 3. This policy moved the human towards their target by
A*, although avoiding stepping on a Robber prematurely, with probability 0.9 and
selected a random action with probability 0.1. The heuristic model was otherwise the
same as the decision theoretic model, including A.
For Collaborative Ghostbuster we also built a heuristic model using the same
strategy. As with the Cops and Robbers model we replaced r with the action selection
strategy used by the simulated human in Chapter 3.
For Hidden Gold we again built a heuristic model that represents a suboptimal
human player who wanders around searching for the gold without remembering where
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it or the sidekick have already looked. We modeled the intention to search at each X
as a type-variable in the human's internal state, as with the other two domains. r and
A were constructed according to the following rules: The human's default action was
to move towards the X corresponding to its target using A*. If the human received a
glimmer observation it switched its type to that of the X at which the glimmer was
spotted. Upon reaching its target X, if it received a glimmer observation it stood on
the X and switched to saying "Yarr" with 0.5 probability each time step. If not, it
switched to a new type selected uniformly at random. If it heard the sidekick say
"Yarr" while standing within one square of an X it switched to that X's type. If
not standing on gold, it also switched types with probability 0.1 to a new one chosen
uniformly at random. With probability 0.1 the human's action would instead be
selected at random.
4.5.4 Simulated humans
We used simulated humans as partners in evaluating each controller. For Cops and
Robbers and Collaborative Ghostbuster we used the same simulated humans as in
Chapter 3. For Hidden Gold we used the human model described above as the
simulated human, but without the random target switching behavior. In all domains,
the initial targets of the simulated humans were chosen uniformly at random.
4.5.5 Trials
For all maps in all domains we ran 100 trials for each controller. We used a turn limit
of 100 for Cops and Robbers on C&R1 through 5 and 200 for every other domain and
map. We measured the mean number of steps required to complete the game, either
by catching a robber in Cops and Robbers, eliminating all the ghosts in Collaborative
Ghostbuster, or retrieving the treasure in Hidden Gold. We also measured the mean
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wall clock time taken to select an action. Our tests were run on a system with a
quad-core 2.3GHz Intel i7 processor and 8GB of RAM.
4.5.6 Results and Discussion
4.5.6.1 Cops and Robbers
We compared three variants of the POMCP controller to investigate the contributions
of different aspects of the controller to its performance in Cops and Robbers, partic-
ularly in comparison to the QMDP controller from Chapter 3. These were POMCP,
POMCP-NC, and POMCP-Q.
POMCP used the heuristic model and had full access to communication actions. It
was the most advantaged controller. Its human model's policy matched the simulated
human's, although its internal state update function did not, and communication gave
it a near oracular action for discovering the human's true goal with minimal effort.
This gave it a double advantage over QMDP, whose model did not match so closely
and which did not have access to communication.
POMCP-NC used the heuristic model with communication actions disabled. It
was forced to infer human intentions solely from their actions, which put it on a more
even footing with QMDP, but its model still closely matched the simulated human.
POMCP-Q used the decision-theoretic human model with communication actions
disabled, making its capabilities the most directly comparable to QMDP.
Figure 4.5.6.1 shows the mean steps taken by each controller in C&R1 through 5.
Error bars show standard the standard error of the sample mean. POMCP was the
best performer over all, with POMCP-NC only marginally worse in most cases. As a
result of its belief-space planning, on C&R2 though 5 POMCP consistently used its
communication action within its first four actions to disambiguate the human's goal
and was able to respond well from that point onwards.
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Figure 4-3: Mean steps taken by each controller to catch a robber in C&R1 through
5.
Like QMDP, POMCP-NC was forced to wait for the human's actions to disam-
biguate their goal or overcommit early, resulting in worse performance. Overcommit-
ment to chasing the wrong target was most apparent in C&R5, where the controller
typically followed a strategy of gambling on stepping through a door early in the hope
of picking the right target and preventing the human from walking all the way up the
center, which it would do if the sidekick instead waited. This led to a worse mean
score and higher variance.
On most maps the QMDP and POMCP-Q controllers showed similar behavior,
with the exception of C&R2, in which POMCP-Q performed very poorly. On this map
POMCP-Q consistently misinterpreted the human's initial actions as chasing the blue
robber when it was in fact chasing yellow or green, leading them to enter the western
door and become stuck. A combination of factors produced this behavior. First, the
decision-theoretic human model judged any actions other than passing as diagnostic
for blue. This is because, in the optimal joint policies for red and yellow, the human is
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expected to wait for the sidekick to drive the robbers closer before the human needs
to move. Second, the model that POMCP-Q uses assumes a cooperative human
that will reason correctly about the sidekick's predicament and attempt to drive the
robber that they are actually chasing through the western door to it. However, the
simulated human is in fact a myopic A* agent that doesn't consider how important it
is to coordinate, which contributes to the POMCP-Q controller underestimating how
bad committing to step through the door is. Finally, the sidekick's model suggested
that there was some chance that the human may change targets and chase blue,
leading them to misjudge how much of a commitment stepping through the west
door was. QMDP, by contrast, plans under the assumption that the human's target
will never change, which leads to a more dire assessment of committing to chasing
blue too early.
It is clear from these results that having an accurate human model has a large
impact on POMCP's performance. In particular, the optimistic assumption that the
human will be cooperative and coordinate well, when in fact they behave myopically,
can lead to making bad decisions that are hard to recover from. This highlights the
need for careful modeling of human behavior for good performance in domains with
actions that can have actions whose effects are not easily reversed and require close
coordination with the human. Attempting to learn the true human model over time
could also help to mitigate these problems, but setting up this learning task is a
challenge in itself.
For a domain like Cops and Robbers, one possibility would be to generate two
sets of types and type-policies to include in the human model, one myopic and one
cooperative. The tradeoff is that this would increase the dimensionality of the state-
space, potentially making particle filtering belief updates less accurate.
Table 4.1 shows the sample mean and standard deviation of the wall clock time
taken for each of the POMCP controllers to select an action, averaged across all maps
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with 100 runs each. POMCP-Q performed substantially worse than the other two,
with decision times that are unacceptable for play with a real human. We suspect that
this was the result of a bad interaction between the Manhattan distance minimization
rollout bias and the actions of the decision-theoretic model causing POMCP to find
it hard to reach a terminal state before the step limit, particularly in the early stages
of the game. A large part of the variance in mean decision time was due to POMCP
ending simulated histories early when they reached a terminal state. This led to
decision times being lower when the sidekick and human were close to catching a
robber. We will return to the interaction between the number of simulated histories,
decision time, and action quality in the Section 4.5.6.4.
Controller Mean decision time
POMCP 1.409s (0.46s)
POMCP-NC 1.875s (0.75s)
POMCP-Q 8.924s (1.11s)
Table 4.1: Mean decision times in seconds for POMCP to produce an action on C&R1
through 5 averaged over 100 trials for each map. Sample standard deviations are in
parentheses.
4.5.6.2 Collaborative Ghostbuster
In contrast to Cops and Robbers, POMCP and QMDP performed at similar level
in Collaborative Ghostbuster, despite the differences in their human models. As
Figure 4-4 shows, the mean number of steps was comparable, particularly given the
standard error shown in the error bars. Qualitatively, the strategies pursued by both
planners were similar.
A combination of factors led to this result. The lack of elements in the domain
that punish overcommitment to pursuing the wrong goal, such as the one-way door
traps in Cops and Robbers, made undoing a mistake such as moving to herd the
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Figure 4-4: Mean steps taken by each controller to zap all ghosts in GB1 and 2.
wrong ghost relatively cheap. This could also be seen in C&R1, which had no doors.
In contrast to Cops and Robbers, for most cases in Collaborative Ghostbuster the
actions of the simulated human and the actions of QMDP's decision-theoretic model
matched for each target ghost, which helped QMDP with both action selection and
state estimation.
Table 4.2 shows the mean decision time for POMCP to select an action. There
is a dramatic difference between the two maps, which likely stems from the fact that
in GB1 the human could zap the ghost to its north on its first step, making the
subsequent searching much easier since there were only two possible active human
types from that point onwards and the length of the full plan required to catch the
remaining ghosts was nearly one third shorter. We did not test the impact of reducing
the number of simulated histories on action selection time and action quality, but the
results reported for Cops and Robbers in Section 4.5.6.4 are likely applicable for this
domain too.
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Controller Mean decision time
GB1 5.99 (0.29)
GB2 13.28 (0.15)
Table 4.2: Mean decision times in seconds for POMCP to produce an action on GB1
and GB2 averaged over 100 trials for each map. Sample standard deviations are in
parentheses.
4.5.6.3 Hidden Gold
Results for the Hidden Gold maps are shown in Figure 4-5. In HG1 through 3 the
POMCP player and the heuristic player were comparable in their performance, but
in HG4 the POMCP player significantly outperformed the heuristic player. On this
map the sidekick consistently chose to go north and check both Xs, which is the most
efficient search path. By contrast, the heuristic controller picked an X at random,
and even if it picked one of the top Xs, had only a 0.5 chance of picking the other top
X if it investigated the first and found that the gold was not there, leading to more
backtracking in expectation.
By contrast, the heuristic planner matched up well with the POMCP controller on
the other maps, largely due to the layout of the Xs. On HG1 the behaviors of the two
controllers were largely indistinguishable. In HG2 and 3 the layout of the Xs meant
that if either the player or the sidekick by chance happened to choose to search at
either of the northeast Xs in HG2 or at the southeast X in HG3, they also incidentally
searched at another X on the way there. In both HG2 and HG3 POMCP's strategy
was to search in locations closest to it first, which was only marginally more efficient
than the heuristic sidekick.
Table 4.3 gives the mean decision times for each of the maps. Again, early termi-
nations in searches lead to a high variance in search times, resulting in faster searches
once the gold has been found or narrowed down to one location. The lack of a heuristic
for rollouts likely contributed to the longer decision times than in the other domains.
112
POMCP vs Heuristic in Hidden Gold
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Figure 4-5: Mean steps taken
4.
by each controller to retrieve the gold in HG1 through
Map Mean decision time
HG1 7.57 (5.42)
HG2 9.97 (6.56)
HG3 13.24 (7.61)
HG4 11.61 (7.77)
Table 4.3: Mean decision time in seconds for POMCP to produce an action on HG1
through 4 averaged over 100 trials for each map. Sample standard deviations are in
parentheses.
4.5.6.4 Larger Domains
We saw across the different domains that mean decision time could vary widely de-
pending on the plan length required, even with a fixed number of simulated histories.
For modern video game titles, more than a few milliseconds of decision time is con-
sidered unacceptable for real time responsiveness, and for these simple domains the
mean decision time has been orders of magnitude higher than this. Ideally, we would
like to reduce the mean decision time by using fewer simulations, while keeping action
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quality high. We would also like to know how POMCP performs in domains larger
than those tractable for the controllers in Chapter 3.
For testing the effect of varying the number of simulations, we used the two large
Cops and Robbers maps, Li and L2, which were intractable for our value iteration
implementation due to the state space size. The search horizons for these maps were
significantly longer that for C&R1-5, with the best-case shortest path to catch the
furthest robber in each map being 44 and 72 steps respectively, making them very
challenging. For each map we measured the mean number of steps taken and mean
decision time for POMCP with the planner settings described in Section 4.5.2 and
a varying number of simulated histories from 10 through 100,000, incrementing in
multiples of 10. Communication actions were allowed. We used the standard myopic
simulated human and the heuristic human model with the same settings as for the
trials on C&R1-5. We averaged the results for each controller setting over 100 trials.
The mean number of steps taken to catch a robber are shown in Figure 4.5.6.4
and the mean decision times are given in Table 4.4. The mean decision time scaled
roughly linearly with the number of simulated histories, which is as expected.
For L1, the mean number of steps taken decreased approximately logarithmically
with the number of simulated histories before plateauing at around 70 steps. At
10,000 simulated histories the mean number of steps taken to catch the furthest
robber was 104.6, substantially higher than the 44 steps minimum. By contrast, the
number of steps taken to catch the closest robber was 22.4, relatively close to the
18 step minimum. This aligns with our intuition that POMCP should find it harder
to construct plans that require searching deeply in the tree of action-observation
histories.
In L2, the furthest robber was never caught in any trial. The overall performance
of POMCP improved much more slowly and plateaued much faster, reflecting the
longer search horizons required to find action sequences resulting in a catching a
114
robber. Even with 100,000 simulated histories, the closest robber was only caught
in 72.7 steps on average, when the best-case shortest path was 46 steps. The next
closest, at 56 steps in the best case, was only caught in one out of the 100 trials,
suggesting that the effective search horizon fell somewhere between these two cases.
Mean Score vs Simulations
-*-Map Ll -U-Map L2
250 -
200
U150
50 - -
0 -
10 100 1000 10000 100000
Simulations
Figure 4-6: Score scaling results for maps LI and L2. Mean score improves logarith-
mically with the number of simulations before plateauing.
Simulated histories Li L2
10 0.002 (0) 0.01 (0)
100 0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)
1000 0.2 (0.03 ) 0.37 (0.07)
10000 1.79 (0.21) 3.23 (0.58)
100000 16.38 (2.55) 31.05 (5.38)
Table 4.4: Mean decision time in seconds for POMCP to produce an action on two
large maps averaged over 100 trials for each map. Wall clock time scales linearly with
the number of simulated histories. Sample standard deviation is given in parentheses.
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4.5.6.5 Ensemble PO-UCT
One hope for reducing mean decision time and improving action quality is to use
ensemble POMCP. We should bear in mind that in the worst case we will be searching
in a tree that branches exponentially in the search horizon, and there is only so much
that linearly scaling the search through adding additional cores can ultimately help.
Recall from Section 4.4 here are two possibilities for improving performance. The
first is to gain parallel time advantage, which occurs if an ensemble of searches split
across multiple cores with k simulated histories per search outperforms a single-core
search with k simulated histories. If parallel time advantage exists then it means that
a controller can be improved by running using the same amount of time to perform
work across multiple cores and achieve higher quality actions. The second is to gain
single-core time advantage, which occurs if an ensemble of size n with k simulated
histories per tree equals or outperforms a single-core search with n - k simulated
histories. Single-core time advantage is particularly beneficial, since it implies that
the mean decision time can be reduced by performing multiple faster searches in
parallel, rather than one expensive search, without a loss of quality.
In evaluating POMCP with ensemble PO-UCT on Cops and Robbers we used the
same controller, model, and simulated human settings as for the scalability tests. We
focused on L1, which was the largest map in which each of robbers could be caught
by a controller running a reasonable number of simulated histories. We ran trials
for a range of trajectory counts and ensemble sizes, with 100 trials per combination,
recording the mean number of steps taken to capture a robber. Tables 4.5 through 4.7
break down the results by the human's target.
The number of simulated histories increases by powers of two down the columns
and the ensemble size increases similarly across the rows. A parallel time advantage
corresponds to a decreasing values across a row.
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Along the diagonals, the total number of simulated histories for a trial are equal.
For instance in Table 4.5 the two shaded cells both represent trials with 212 total
simulated histories, in one case on a single core, and in the other split across two
cores. A single-core time advantage corresponds to decreasing values from top to
bottom along a diagonal. The shaded cells in Table 4.5 are an example of this.
Table 4.5 gives the results for catching the red robber, which has the shortest
minimum number of steps required. The results show that finding a close to optimal
strategy for this is relatively easy, with mean scores around 23 and low variance
being the norm once the total number of simulated histories reaches 213. There are
two exceptions to this in the first and third rows, which may be due to noise in
the human model allowing the robber to escape in a trial. Only the highlighted cells
demonstrate a significant single-core time advantage. This is most likely because with
only a relatively small number of simulated histories, the optimal path consistently
falls within the search tree, so there is no advantage to be gained from performing
the search on multiple cores.
Ensemble SizeSimulated histories per tree 1 2 4
211 34.79 (2.99) 28.71 (0.62) 34.5 (3.41)
212 32.31 (2.69) 23.94 (0.39) 24.53 (0.46)
213 25.86 (0.51) 24.12 (0.37) 23.26 (0.43)
214 25.93 (0.79) 22.72 (0.32) 22.23 (0.45)
2 5 23.72 (0.57) 22.94 (0.35) 23.5 (0.41)
216 24.29 (0.57) 28.54 (3.34) 22.35 (0.37)
Table 4.5: Scores for range of ensemble settings on Li with Red as the target. Stan-
dard error for the 100 trials is given in parentheses.
The results for catching the blue robber, which required the second shortest plan,
are given in Table 4.6. Although the results are noisy, there is evidence to suggest the
existence of both parallel time advantage and single-core time advantage. Increasing
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the number of cores to 2 improved performance in 4 out of 6 cases and increasing it to
4 improved it in 5 out of 6 cases. For configurations with 214 or more total simulated
histories, a parallel time advantage can be seen in 3 out of the 4 diagonals in the
table. Our interpretation is that there is a minimum number of simulated histories
per tree required to regularly find a good solution in expectation, and that single-core
time advantage is most apparent once this threshold is reached.
Ensemble SizeSimulated histories per tree 1 2 4
211 103.24 (5.98) 102.42 (6.06) 87.03 (5.46)
212 81.27 (4.91) 100.09 (5.97) 72.5 (4.54)
213 83.4 (5.6) 78.06 (4.98) 66.45 (3.83)
214 86.48 (5.45) 67.56 (4.29) 91.00 (6.56)
215 83.11 (5.81) 87.56 (5.94) 62.46 (3.45)
216 93.51 (6.16) 66.00 (4.36) 64.16 (3.95)
Table 4.6: Scores for range of ensemble settings on LI with Blue as the target.
Standard error for the 100 trials is given in parentheses.
Table 4.7 gives the results for catching the yellow robber, which requires the
longest plan of the three. With both 2 and 4 cores there was a parallel time advan-
tage in only 3 out of 6 cases and only one diagonal demonstrates a single-core time
advantage. Since even with 100,000 simulated histories, almost twice as many as
shown here, the mean score achieved by POMCP for catching yellow was 102.59, this
suggests that catching yellow sooner consistently would require substantially more
simulated histories for POMCP to consistently choose higher quality actions. Our
interpretations is that these results are largely statistical noise, and that more total
simulated histories would be required for either parallel or single-core time advantage
to be apparent.
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Ensemble SizeSimulated histories per tree 1 2 4
211 99.68 (4.45) 100.00 (4.58) 127.71 (6.23)
212 112.54 (5.72) 106.28 (5.82) 97.94 (5.44)
213 118.21 (5.96) 93.5 (5.48) 91.55 (5.22)
214 86.5 (4.66) 108.77 (6.37) 94.53 (5.57)
215 89.97 (5.31) 105.28 (5.92) 73.26 (3.64)
216 100.59 (6.22) 96.57 (5.81) 94.06 (5.33)
Table 4.7: Scores for range of ensemble settings on Li with Yellow as the target.
Standard error for the 100 trials is given in parentheses..
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter demonstrated an approach to the Al sidekick problem that extended
the capabilities of the sidekick beyond the constraints of the state-space planning
based approaches of the previous chapter. POMCP naturally accounts for the effects
of information gathering and communication actions on its belief state and also can
be applied in domains with partial observability that extends beyond hidden human
intentions. However, in making the move to more challenging partially observable
domains we were forced to abandon our decision-theoretic approach to building hu-
man models. As the results in this chapter showed, the fidelity of a human model
can have a strong impact on the quality of actions, particularly when there are irre-
versible detrimental actions in the domain. This places a heavy modeling burden on
a developer who is interested in using POMCP to address the Al sidekick problem in
a real game.
In terms of scaling, for Cops and Robbers, and similar stochastic shortest path
problems, there appear to be three cases that this chapter demonstrates, which can
be characterized by the length of the plan required to reach a goal state.
The first case occurs when goal state is well outside of the search horizon covered
by the search tree, meaning it is very infrequently reached by rollouts. In this case
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increasing the number of simulated histories in POMCP may give a worse than log-
arithmic improvement in performance in the number of simulated histories until the
search tree becomes deep enough for the goal state to be consistently reached from
its leaves. This seemed to be the case for the two furthest robbers in L2, where in
each case the goal was so distant that the number of simulated histories required for
the search tree to grow close to them reliably in expectation was higher than was
reasonable for a responsive sidekick controller. This also seemed to be the case with
the yellow robber in L1, where neither increasing the number of simulated histories,
nor the number of cores used in ensemble PO-UCT, reliably produced a gain in action
quality for the values we tested.
The second case is when goal states are at a search depth that is not consistently
reached by the search tree, but is potentially reachable by rollouts from the leaves.
In this case increasing the number of simulated histories can help, trading time for
action quality by reducing the variance in POMCP's V* estimates. Another option
is to keep the number of simulated histories constant and increase the number of
cores, gaining parallel time advantage through ensemble PO-UCT. There may also
be a range of total simulated histories, as demonstrated in the case of the blue robber
in L1, for which using an ensemble of size n with k simulated histories can give as
good or better performance as a single search with n -k simulated histories, yielding
single-core time advantage.
The final case is when the goal reliably falls within the range of POMCP's search,
possibly within the search tree itself, as with the red robber in L1. In this case adding
further simulated histories or cores gives marginal or no benefit.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Contributions
This thesis brings together two threads of research in game Al, user modeling and
automatic planning, and addresses them within a decision-theoretic planning frame-
work. The decision-theoretic approach to building sidekick controllers for games was
recently pioneered by Nguyen et al. in their CAPIR framework [45]. CAPIR itself
built upon the decision theoretic model of assistance developed by Fern et al., whose
core innovation was to build human models from the joint value function derived from
solving a MDP representing a human and their Al sidekick perfectly collaborating,
and then use approximate POMDP solution methods to plan actions [22]. Our work
started from that idea, and developed it further.
Our first contribution was to give an explicit formulation of the Al sidekick prob-
lem as a POMDP, specifically with an embedded human model that has internal
states that are potentially hidden, a process that cause those states to be updated
based on observations, and a process that causes actions to be selected on the basis
of those states. This general formulation covers the specific case that Fern et. al and
CAPIR pioneered, but also generalizes the problem to allow for human models that
121
act in domains that are only partially observable by them as well as the sidekick,
whereas the previous formulation assumed that the domain was fully observable by
the human. Our formulation of the problem as a POMDP is a compromise between
generality and tractability. We assume that we know the dynamics of the human
model, which allows us to avoid the intractability of richer decision-theoretic models
such as POSGs, but at the cost of having to define those models.
Formulating the problem in this way allowed us to consider extensions to the
capabilities of an AI sidekick that went beyond CAPIR's. Our second contribution
was to explore a variety of approximate solution techniques that first recreated the
capabilities of CAPIR and then extended them to include actions that specifically
aim to gather information about the hidden state of the world. This allowed us to
incorporate communication and question asking into our sidekick agent's behavioral
repertoire via a range of heuristic action selection methods that were based on state-
space planning. We demonstrated this in the Cops and Robbers domain and showed
that these techniques also perform on a par with the QMDP approach that CAPIR
used in the Collaborative Ghostbuster domain.
From there we addressed two limitations of the the methods based on state-space
planning. The first was a scalability limitation imposed by the need to exactly solve
large MDPs. The second was a representational limitation that required that domains
be fully observable, aside from the human's internal state. We introduced the use of
POMCP, a POMDP solution technique introduced by Silver and Veness that scales
well in large POMDPs, to address these problems jointly. This, allowed us to consider
how to interact with a more general class domains and of human models, but also
precluded automatically generating human models through joint MDP solving.
Our third contribution was to build controllers using POMCP as a planning
method and demonstrate empirically that they could perform at least as well as
the methods introduced earlier for small domains, and could perform reasonably well
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on larger domains that were unapproachable by value iteration.
Finally, our fourth contribution was to extend POMCP itself by introducing en-
semble methods for parallelization, which we demonstrated allowed us to choose
higher quality actions in less time than standard POMCP in some cases. We also
offered some suggestions as to what characterized the cases where this was possible
on the basis or our empirical results.
5.2 Future work
There are three key directions that we have identified for extending the work in this
thesis; user studies, human modeling, and scaling.
Although we have demonstrated the performance of our sidekick controller when
paired with simulated humans and noted the failure cases in that setting, we have
not conducted any extensive user studies. User studies would help to understand
the relative merits of the different controllers from an HCI perspective. User studies
could also help us to understand human expectations of sidekicks and motivate new
directions for developing controllers. Additionally, data collection from the studies
would give us a data set from which we could explore ways to learn human models.
As we saw from the results in Cops and Robbers on planners that used a decision-
theoretic human model but were paired with a heuristic simulated human, having an
incorrect human model can have a major negative impact on sidekick performance,
particularly when actions are irreversible or could have serious negative consequences.
Ideally we would like a sidekick to adapt to a specific human partner's play style.
There are several possible approaches.
As alluded to, we may try learning models from historical data of humans playing.
This approach has been explored by the BotPrize community for games domains.
In 2012 the bot UT 2 used recorded data from humans playing Unreal Tournament
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2004 to generate controllers for Al opponents that mimicked human behavior, and
convinced judges that it was human in over 50% of cases [35]. Given the success of
this approach as a generative model for human-like behavior, it may hold promise as
general human modeling strategy.
Instead of learning from recorded data, we could try to learn the human model
on the fly, by treating the game as a Bayes-adaptive POMDP, which would lets us
set up a reinforcement learning problem to simultaneously learn the model and plan
actions [53]. However, current state-of-the-art planners are not yet at a point where
they would be able to scale even to the size of the smaller Cops and Robbers problems.
Recent advances in approximate methods for fully observable Bayes-adaptive MDPs,
however, may point the way to improvements in planners for partially observable
domains [28].
An alternative approach, that faces similar tractability challenges, is to generalize
the decision-theoretic human model that we constructed with state-space planning
by introducing partial observability. In this set up, we would assume that the human
expects that they are perfectly coordinating with the sidekick, but in this case with
the added challenge of partial observability, which makes the problem a decentralized
POMDP. We could then construct a human model using the Dec-POMDP value
function in a similar manner to our state-space planning approach. Again, however,
this would require us to solve a large Dec-POMDP. One possible approach could be
to approximate the value function instead. A recent survey of the progress being
made in this direction in the Dec-POMDP community was compiled by Oliehoek [47]
and there has also been recent work on combining this approach with Bayes-adaptive
methods [1].
As seen in the results for the larger Cops and Robbers maps, scaling to larger
domains remains a challenge, even with heuristic human models. Commercial video
games typically have domains with orders of magnitude larger state spaces and longer
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planning horizons than the largest Cops and Robbers map for which our planner
showed adequate performance. Directly applying a POMCP planner in a commercial
video game may be possible, but would likely require the problem to be represented
at a higher level of abstraction than low level states and actions.
Part of what makes large Cops and Robbers maps challenging for the planner is the
navigation problem of getting through the maze, even when a fine level of coordination
is not required. One strategy for scaling up the Cops and Robbers planner would be
to offload some of the navigational concerns to a specialized controller and instead
plan at a more abstract level, where actions move the sidekick to different locations
in the map, executed by the navigation system, rather than in the cardinal directions.
The planner could then potentially switch to a lower level of abstraction when the
sidekick was close to the robber for finer grained reasoning about coordination.
We suspect that in general this kind of hierarchical decomposition of the planning
problem into different levels of abstraction has the most potential for making POMCP
applicable in real commercial games. Using abstract macro-actions for planning has
been explored by other researchers and has been shown to be helpful in scaling Monte
Carlo based POMDP solution methods to large domains [39]. This does however
introduce the modeling problem of selecting appropriate macro actions and state
abstractions. In the fully observable case, researchers have developed methods for
automatically forming hierarchical MDPs and solving them efficiently [33], but the
partially observable case remains largely unexplored.
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